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ALLOCATION OF LOSSES FROM CHECK FORGERIES UNDER
THE LAW OF NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS AND THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE*
THE allocation of forgery losses arising from the use of checks presents
a difficult task for the courts. While the number of forged checks 1 is small
in relation to the total number of valid checks,2 the loss to the community
is nevertheless substantial. The exact figures have never been authoritatively
itemized, but the scope of loss is indicated by estimates that as much as
$400,000,000 annually is obtained by fraudulent check artists.3 Since funds
which have been paid out to a forger frequently cannot be recouped, some
legitimate member of the commercial community must bear the loss. The law
of negotiable instrunents determines who that member shall be.
Procedurally, the way in which the law allocates losses frequently involves
a chain of recoveries among the parties associated with the check. Of course,
the forger is always liable for the loss he causes. But where a forger is
absent or unable to pay, innocent parties will bear the loss. The party who
has taken the instrument from the forger, for example, may find that he is
unable to cash the check because the forgery has since been discovered.4 Then
*This study is limited to checks. An institutional study of other iitrumvnt may sug-
gest that they be handled in different ways. See Comment, Share tcrlificate X.yotif' ility,
7 U. OF CH. L. REv. 497 (1940).
1. Forgery as herein used includes the making of a false endorsement or drawer's
signature, raising the face amount of the check, altering the named payee, or any com-
bination of these.
2. More than ninety-nine percent of checks circulating through the bank collecting
system are finally paid. AzimacAw Lw IxsTrnuTn & NAT. CoN7. or Co!tUssIo:;a-ns o:
U oNUOR3 STATE LAWS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, OFFICIAL DRAFT 479 (tet and cam-
ments ed. 1952) (hereinafter cited as U.C.C.).
3. Reports on total losses vary considerably. Estimates of $400,000,000 are reported
by Lloyd Wendt, Check Carefully on that Check, Chicago Sunday Tribune Magazine,
March 19, 1950, p. 5, and by Communication to YALE LAw JoURNA. from George Adlam,
Manager, Insurance Department, The Todd Co., dated March 27, 1952, on file in the Yale
Law Library. Other authorities set loss at $20,000,000 annually-James E. Vaum, The
Big Pluz in Forgery, American Bankers Association Protective Bulletin, Sept., 1950,
p. 3-; or $500,000 to $800,000 annually-Note, 14 U. oF Cur. L R%,. 705, 709 (1947).
In 1951 the Secret Service investigated 35,957 forged checks worth $2,679,593.40 and
arrested 2,304 check and bond forgers. Communication to the Y.,aL w Jou'.IAL from
U. E. Baughman, Chief, U.S. Secret Service, dated Feb. 2S, 1952, on file in the Yale La,
Library.
4. "When a signature is forged or made without the authority of the person whoze
signature it purports to be, it is wholly inoperative, and no right to retain the instrument,
or to give a discharge therefor, or to enforce payment thereof against any party thereto,
can be acquired through or under such signature, unless the party against whom it is
sought to enforce such right is precluded from setting up the forgery or want of author-
ity." NEGOTIABLE INsTRUmExTs LAw § 23. Edgington v. Security-First Nat. Bank of Los
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he is left with a worthless piece of paper. However, he may have deposited
the check for collection in a bank before the forgery was unearthed. If the
collecting bank finds that it is unable to cash the check it will attempt to fall
back for recovery upon the party who deposited the checkY The collecting
bank, however, may have already obtained payment from the bank on whom
the check was drawn, i.e., the drawee bank. The drawee bank will try to debit
the account of the person who drew the check, i.e., the drawer.0 When it is
successful, loss shifts to the drawer. But if it cannot debit the account, the
drawee may either be left with the worthless check 7 or it may have an action
against the collecting bank.8 When the collecting bank must repay funds to
the drawee, it can in turn fall back upon the party who negotiated the check
Angeles, 78 Cal. App. 2d 849, 179 P.2d 640 (1947) (forgery a defense against liability on
check under NIL § 23); Elyria Savings & Banking Co. v. Walker Bin Co., 92 Ohio
St. 406, 111 N.E. 147 (1915) (forged endorsement) ; Cowan v. Thompson, 25 Tenn. App,
130, 152 S.W.2d 1036 (1941) (forged drawer's signature).
5. The bank, if it has given cash or allowed the party to withdraw funds against the
check, will have an action on the warranty accompanying negotiation "That the instru-
ment is genuine and in all respects what it purports to be; That he [tile person negotiat-
ing the instrument] has a good title to it." NIL §§ 65, 66. Frequently, however, the bank
has an agreement with the depositor that checks are credited subject to final payment.
Then when a check is returned unpaid, the bank has a right to charge back tile item
against the depositor's account. See cases cited notes 9 and 22 infra.
6. The drawee bank has a contractual relationship with the depositor to pay funds
out of his account only according to his order. This may be an implied contract. Denbigh
v. First Nat. Bank of Seattle, 102 Wash. 546, 174 Pac. 475 (1918). But many banks have the
following clause on the Depositor's Contract for checking accounts: "To (Name of Bank).
You are authorized to recognize any of the signatures subscribed below in the payment
of funds or the transaction of any business for this account." Thus the bank would be able
to debit the depositor's account only if the depositor were precluded from denying the
forgery. See United States v. National City Bank of N.Y., 28 F. Supp. 144 (S.D.N.Y.
1939) ; Magid v. Drexel Nat. Bank, 330 Ill. App. 486, 71 N.E.2d 898 (1947) ; Connors
v. Old Forge Discount & Deposit Bank, 245 Pa. 97, 91 Atl. 210 (1914): cases cited
notes 16, 20, 40-3a infra.
7. This would occur, for example, when the drawee bank had taken the check from
the forger, Hays v. Lowndes Savings Bank & Trust Co., 118 W. Va. 360, 190 S.E, 543
(1937) ; or was denied recovery from prior parties, see notes 17, 98 in! ra.
8. Recovery on check with forged indorsement: e.g., Farmers' Bank & Trust Co. v.
Farmers' State Bank of Brookport, 148 Ark. 599, 231 S.W. 7 (1921); Hartford-Conlcec-
ticut Trust Co. v. Riverside Trust Co., 123 Conn. 616, 197 Atl. 766 (1938) ; Furlong v.
Manufacturers' Nat. Bank of Detroit, 285 Mich. 517, 281 N.W. 309 (1938); and cases
cited note 21 infra. Recovery on check with forged drawer's signature: e.g., First Nat.
Bank of Danvers v. First Nat. Bank of Salem, 151 Mass. 280, 24 N.E. 44 (1890);
People's Bank v. Franklin Bank, 88 Tenn. 299, 12 S.W. 716 (1889); Canadian Bank of
Commerce v. Bingham, 30 Wash. 484, 71 Pac. 43 (1902); cases cited notes 45, 142
infra. Recovery on altered check: e.g., Union Tool Co. v. Farmers' & Merchants' Nat.
Bank, 192 Cal. 40, 218 Pac. 424 (1923); Andrews v. Sibley, 220 Mass. 10, 107 N.E.
395 (1914) ; Trustees of German Evangelical Lutheran St. John's Congregation v, Mer-




to it.9 In some instances the check may have been stolen from its true owner.
The true owner will usually have an action against the drawer of the check
on any underlying obligation for which the check was given,' ° or an action
against any of the other parties associated with the instrument." Occasionally
the true owner will have no possibility of recovery and wil bear the loss. 12
Thus the law of negotiable instruments may ultimately place forgery losses
on any of five parties: the taker from the forger, the collecting bank, the drawvee
bank, the drawer, or the true owner.13
HOW THE LAW ALLOCATES LossEs
The allocation of losses resulting from check forgeries stems from a complex
and interrelated body of statutory and case law. Basically, the law allocates
losses among parties according to a set of mechanical doctrines that differ
according to the type of forgery which prompted the loss.14 However, the
introduction of negligence concepts to avoid placing loss on parties who
exercised care, while others did not, frequently alters the allocation based on
types of forgery.'5 And the peculiar variance in the availability of some de-
fenses in actions founded on check forgeries further changes the incidence
of loss.
9. See National Bank of Detroit v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md., 291 Mich. 356, 273
N.V. 325 (1939); Williams v. Tishomingo Savings Institution, 57 Miss. 633 (13ZS);
Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. First Nat. Bank in Dallas, - Tex. - , 245 S.W.2d 237
(1951). For discussion of basis of recovery see note 5 supra.
10. Shephard & Morse Lumber Co. v. Eldridge, 171 Mass. 516, 51 X.E. 9 (1393);
Rettinghouse v. Krey Paclkng Co., 200 S.W.2d 584 (Mo. App. 1947); Falconi v. Magee,
47 Pa. Super. 560 (1911); cases cited note 23 infra. But cf. note Z0 infra.
11. Suit against drawee bank: e.g., Tarrant American Savings Bank v. Smokeless
Fuel Co., 232 Ala. 507, 172 So. 603 (1937) ; cases cited note 24 infra. Suit against .A-
lecting bank: e.g., Universal Carloading & Distributing Co. v. South Side Bank, 224 ,o.
App. 876, 27 S.V2d 76S (1930) ; cases cited note 25 infra. Suit against an indorser sub-
sequent to theft: e.g., Blum v. Whipple, 194 Mass. 253, 'O X.E. 501 (1907) ; cases citc-d
note 26 infra.
12. Louisville & Nashville Ry. v. Citizens' & People's Nat. Bank of Penasacla, 74
Fla. 385, 77 So. 104 (1917) (agent of payee who had authority to receive but not to cash
checks obtained check); Brown v. People's Nat. Bank, 170 Mich. 416, 136 .\V. $0
(1912) (payee's delay in notification of drawee estopped recovery). And see notes 23. 30,
62 infra.
13. A random survey of 75 cases decided since 1930 shows the following results:
Taker: won 6, lost 6; Collecting Bank: won 12, lost 5; Drawee Ban.: won 30, lost 31;
Drawer: won 23, lost 30; Trtw Owner: won 7, lost 5. (The total is more than 75 since
several cases involved more than one set of parties.)
14. Of the 75 cases, 21 involved forged checks, 50 involved forged endorsements, and
four involved altered checks.
15. The extent to which negligence doctrines effect the allocation is indicated by the
following breakdown of the 75 cases:
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Allocation by Type of Forgery
Traditionally, courts have attempted to place liability on different parties
depending upon the type of forgery which gave rise to the loss. Thus different
rules are applied to adjudicate the rights of parties under forged checks (ix.,
where the drawer's signature is forged), forged endorsements, or materially
altered checks.
Forged check. If a forged check is the cause of loss, application of standard
doctrine will usually place liability on the drawee who pays out funds on the
instrument. A typical situation occurs when a forger forges the name of a
drawer of a check and uses the check to purchase goods at a store. The store
endorses the check and deposits it at its bank for collection. The check is sent
through banking channels and the bank on whom the check is drawn ultimate-
ly pays on the check and debits the account of the purported drawer. When
the forgery is discovered, the law permits the purported drawer to force the
drawee bank to recredit his account.16 But the drawee generally cannot recover
from the collecting bank,17 and so the drawee is left with what is usually an
If determined without Considering
regard to negligence Negligence
Won Lost Won Lost
Taker 0 7 6 6
Collecting Bank 8 10 12 5
Drawee Bank 4 57 30 31
Drawer 55 4 23 30
True Owner 11 0 7 5
16. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Thompson, 54 Ga. App. 611, 188 S.E. 737 (1936)
Couvillon v. Whitney Nat. Bank of New Orleans, 218 La. 1096, 51 So.2d 798 (1951);
Barmley v. Merrimack Co-op Bank, 285 Mass. 37, 188 N.E. 378 (1933). See discussion
note 6 supra, and additional cases cited notes 116, 124 in!ra. For negligence exceptions
to the rule, see notes 39-43a, 149, 150 infra.
17. This is usually considered an exception to the rule that money paid under mis-
take can be recovered. The leading cases are: Price v. Neal, 3 Burr. 1354, 97 Eng. Rep.
871 (K.B. 1762) ; Levy v. Bank of the United States, 1 Binn. 27 (Pa. 1802) ; Bank of United
States v. Bank of Georgia, 10 Wheat. 333 (U.S. 1825). Contra: First Nat. Bank of Lisbon
v. Wyndemere, 15 N.D. 299, 108 N.W. 546 (1906); cf. Union Nat. Bank v. Franklin Nat.
Bank, 249 Pa. 375, 94 Atl. 1085 (1915). Diverse justifications are offered for the rule: (1)
the drawee is conclusively presumed to know the signature of the drawer, First Nat. Bank
of Quincy v. Ricker, 71 Ill. 439 (1874); Ellis & Morton v. Ohio Life Ins. & Trust Co.,
4 Ohio St. 628 (1855) ; (2) the drawee is negligent in not detecting the forgery, Bank
of Williamson v. McDowell County Bank, 66 W. Va. 545, 66 S.E. 761 (1909); (3) as
between two innocent people who must suffer, he who has legal title must prevail, see
Ames, The Doctrine of Price v. Neal, 4 HARV. L. Rxv. 297, 299, (1891) ; (4) maintain
confidence in negotiable paper, see WOODWARD, THE LAw OF QUAsI-CoNTACrS §§ 80-87
(1913); (5) commercial convenience, see Justice Holmes in Dedham Nat. Bank v.
Everett Nat. Bank, 177 Mass. 392, 59 N.E. 62 (1901). The rule has been incorporated
in the NIL under expansion of § 62, which provides that acceptor engages to pay instru-
ments and admits the existence of the drawer and the genuineness of his signature. Chero-
kee Nat. Bank v. Union Trust Co., 33 Okla. 342, 125 Pac. 464 (1912) ; Fidelity & Casual-
ty Co. v. Planenscheck, 200 Wis. 304, 227 N.W. 387 (1929); it may similarly be incor-
[Vol. 62:417
ALLOCATION OF LOSSES
empty right to recover from the forger. However, in the few situations where
the drawee bank may discover the forgery before it pays on the check, it can
return the check to the collecting bank without payment.18 The collecting
bank will then recover from the store any funds it has advanced on the check,10
and thus the store that took the check from the forger will bear the rill: of
failure to apprehend the forger and recover the funds from him.
Forged Endorsement. When the loss is produced by a forged endorsement
of an order instrument, the burden usually falls upon the party, who takes the
check from the forger. The forged endorsement cases arise, for example.
when a forger steals or finds a genuine heck which is an order instrument.
He then forges the name of the payee, negotiates the check at a store, and the
instrument follows the same course as the forged check previously discussed.
The drawer of the check is generally protected, as.is the purported drawer
in the case of a forged check, since he has a right to have his account recre-
dited if the drawee bank has paid the check and debited his account. - 0 But
porated by inclusion in the law of merchants in NIL § 19L. See Suuth Boston Trust
Co. v. Levin, 249 Mass. 45, 143 N.E. 816 (1924).
Recovery is permitted, however, where no value has been paid for the check. First
State Bank & Trust Co. v. First Nat. Bank of Canton, 314 I11. 269, 145 N.E. 321 (1924) ;
American Surety Co. of New York v. Industrial Savings Bank, 242 Mich. 581, 219 N.W.
689 (1928), 27 MIlCE. L. REv. 100 (1928) ; or if the recipient was not a hulder in due
course, Iron City Nat Bank v. Peyton, 15 Tex. Civ. App. 184, 39 S.W. 223 (197) ; or if
presenter had or should have had knowledge of forgery. Banca Comn'vrciah Italiara
Trust Co. v. Clarkson, 274 N.Y. 69, 8 N.E.2d 281 (1937). For negligence exceptions see
cases cited notes 45, 142 infra. For additioral cases invoking the main rule, see notes 3,
109, 117, 143 infra.
18. See cases cited note 4 supra. Acts which constitute irrevocable payment by the
drawee bank vary. Payment of cash for the check is final pa. ment. Fidelity & Casualty
Co. of New York v. Planenscheck, 200 Wis. 304, 309, 227 N.W. 387, 3S9 (1929). Where
a check is received through the collection system payment is final when Fj.sting is cm-
pleted. N.Y. Nvo. I-xsr. L.w, Art. 19-A, § 3511-b. a. amended by N.Y. La. , .f 1P0), c. 153,
§ 1; but cf. Cohen v. First Nat Bank of Nogales, 22 Ariz. 392, 4110, 14 Pac. 122, 124 (1921
(receipting for item or entry of provisional credit). Under the A!'xucAu ; B,-::Ia-s Asso-
cuATiox MoDEL DKvamED PosTING ST.*TuTE a drawee bank is allowed a full day after
receipt of an item to determine whether or not to pay it, and may revo!;e payment until
midnight of the day following receipt. Such statutes are in force in most states.
19. See notes 5 and 9 supra.
20. Calaway v. Hamilton Nat Bank, 195 F.2d 556 (D.C. Cir. 1952), 40 Gwo. LJ.
626 (1952) ; National Bank of Detroit v. Fidelity & Deposit Cu. of 'Md., 291 Mich. 3L.,
288 NA.W 325 (1939) ; Commonwealth v. Globe Indemnity Co., 323 Pa. 261, 185 AtL 7iJ6
(1936) ; Shorti -. Industrial Trust Co., 75 RI. 482, 67 A.2d 697 (1949) ; Guaranty State
Bank & Trust Co. v. Lively, 108 Tex. 393, 194 S.W. 937 (1917); and see note b s.ura.
But a drawer is denied recovery if the forgery has not caused him loss bcause he
received the proceeds of the forgery. National Surety Corp. v. City Bard: & Trust Cc.,
248 Wis. 32, 20 NAV.2d 559 (1945); Andrews v. Northwestern Nat. Banh, 107 .Minn
196, 117 N.W. 621 (1908), aff'd o;; rehearing, 122 NAV. 499 (1909). But cf. Life In!
Co. of Virginia v. Edisto Nat Bank of Orangeburg, 10 S.C. 505, 165 S.E. 173 (1932)
For negligence exceptions, see notes 48-59 infra.
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contrary to the forged check rule, the drawee bank is entitled to reimburse-
ment from the collecting bank for any funds paid on the check.21 The col-
lecting bank can in turn fall back for recovery upon the store.2 2 Thus the store
sustains the risk of loss contingent on recovery from the forger. The genuine
payee, i.e., the true owner of the check, whose endorsement was forged is not
deprived of his interest in the check, but has alternatives of recovering from
the drawer, 23 the drawee bank,24 the collecting bank,25 or the taker from the
forger.
26
21. Recovery has been permitted on theories of an implied warranty of title accom-
panying presentment for payment-United States v. National Exchange Bank, 45 Fed.
163 (1891) ; money paid under mistake of fact-La Fayette & Brothers v. Merchants
Bank of Ft. Smith, 73 Ark. 561, 84 S.W. 700 (1905) ; First Nat. Bank of Minnesota v.
City Nat. Bank of Holyoke, 182 Mass. 130, 64 N.E. 24 (1902) ; Canal Bank v. Bank of
Albany, 1 Hill. 287 (N.Y. 1841) ; or on basis of warranty as indorser under NIL §§ 65,
66-American Exchange Nat. Bank v. Yorkville Bank of N.Y., 122 Misc. 616, 204 N.Y.
Supp. 621 (Sup. Ct. 1924); Kleinman v. Chase Nat. Bank, 124 Misc. 173, 207 N.Y. Supp.
191 (Sup. Ct. 1924). This latter ground is criticized since warranties are supposed to
run only to holders not to the drawee. American Hominy Co. v. Millikin Nat. Bank, 273
Fed. 550 (S.D. Ill. 1920); First Nat. Bank v. United States Nat. Bank, 100 Ore. 264,
197 Pac. 547 (1921). The action may be defeated if the collecting bank is only a collect-
ing agent under a restrictive endorsement and has turned proceeds over to the indorser.
Cf. National City Bank v. Wescott, 118 N.Y. 468, 23 N.E. 900 (1890); Crocker Wool-
worth Nat. Bank v. Nevada Bank, 139 Cal. 564, 73 Pac. 456 (1903). Similarly, where
the bank has paid the true owner and thus has title. Talbot v. Bank of Rochester, 1 Hill.
295 (N.Y. 1841). In this latter case the instrument is discharged and the drawee can
credit drawer's account. For additional cases allowing recovery see note 8 supra.
22. See Aircraft Trading Co. v. Manufacturers' Trust Co., 297 N.Y. 285, 79 N.E.
2d 249 (1948); cases cited note 9 supra; discussion note 5 supra.
23. Hart v. Moore, 171 Miss. 838, 158 So. 490 (1935); Thomson v. Bank of British
North America, 82 N.Y. 1 (1880); Siegel v. Kovensky, 93 Misc. 541, 157 N.Y. Supp,
340 (Sup. Ct. 1916) ; cases cited note 10 supra. The payee may lose his interest if the
agent who obtained the check had authority to receive but not cash checks. Mills v. Hurley
Hardware & Furniture Co., 129 Ark. 350, 196 S.W. 121 (1917); Morrison v. Chapman,
155 App. Div. 509, 140 N.Y. Supp. 700 (1st Dep't 1913) ; Burnstein v, Sullivan, 134 App. Div.
623, 119 N.Y. Supp. 317 (2d Dep't 1911); Strickland Transport Co. v. First State Bank
of Memphis, 147 Tex. 193, 214 S.W.2d 934 (1948), 11 OHIO ST. L.J. 112 (1950). Or he
may be forced to sue some other party. McFadden v. Follrath, 114 Minn. 85, 130 N.W.
542 (1911); Burstein v. People's Trust Co., 143 App. Div. 165, 127 N.Y. Supp, 1092
(1911). See also note 12 supra; notes 30 and 62 in!ra.
24. Where a drawee formally accepts the check, the true owner may always recover.
See e.g., Citizens & Southern Nat. Bank v. Davis, 54 Ga. App. 836, 188 S.E. 589 (1936).
Where there is no formal acceptance some jurisdictions permit recovery on theories of:
(1) conversion-Louisville & Nashville Ry. v. Citizens' & People's Nat. Bank, 74 Fla.
385, 77 So. 104 (1917); Blacker & Shepard Co. v. Granite Trust Co., 284 Mass. 9, 187
N.E. 53 (1933); Henderson v. Lincoln Rochester Trust Co., 303 N.Y. 27, 100 N.E,2d
117 (1951) (Contra: M. Feitel House Wrecking Co. v. Citizens Bank and Trust Co,, 159
La. 752, 106 So. 292 (1925) ; Gordon Fireworks Co. v. Capital Nat. Bank, 236 Mich. 271,
210 N.W. 263 (1926) ; Strickland Transport Co. v. First State Bank of Memphis, 147
Tex. 193, 214 S.W.2d 934 (1948) ; Miller v. Northern Bank, 239 Wis. 12, 300 N.W. 758
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If the check is a bearer _7 rather than an order instrument, a forged endorse-
ment generally results in the drawer's sustaining the loss. A drawee bank
which pays on such a check is able to debit the drawer's accuunt for funds
paid out.2m And where the drawee bank has not paid, any good faith pur-
chaser for value subsequent to the forgery will be able to compel the drawer
to honor the instrument.2 9 The true owner, in the case of theft, will usually
have an action against the drawer on any underlying debt for which the check
(1941)) ; (2) contract as money had and received-Independent Oil Men's Ass'n v. Fort
Dearborn Nat. Bank, 311 Ill. 278, 142 N.E. 458 (1924); see National Bank of the
Republic v. Millard, 10 Vall. 152, 157-8 (U.S. 1869) (Contra: First Nat. Ban]: v. Whit-
man, 94 U.S. 343 (1876); Lonier v. State Savings Bank, 149 Mich. 483, 112 N.W. 1119
(1907); Henderson v. Lincoln Rochester Trust Co., sufra; Baltimore & Ohio Ry. v.
First Nat. Bank, 102 Va. 753, 47 So. 837 (1904)); (3) constructive accc.tanc--Chnm-
berlain Metal Co. v. Bank of Pleasanton, 98 Kan. 611, 160 Pac. 1138 (1916); cf. Daw-
son v. National Bank of Greenfield, 196 N.C. 134, 144 S.E. 833 (192) ; United States
Fidelity & Guarantee Co. v. Jacobs, 287 S.W. 504 (Tem. Civ. App. 1926) (Contra: First
Nat. Bank v. Whitman, 94 U.S. 343 (1876) ; Elyria Savings Banking Co. v. Walker Bin
Co., 92 Ohio St. 406, 111 N.E. 147 (1915); Lone Star Trucking Co. v. City Nat Bank
of Commerce, 240 S.W. 1000, (Tem. Civ. App. 192)) ; (4) assignment of drawer's rights
-Wormhoudt Lumber Co. v. Union Bank Trust Co., 231 Iowa 928, 2 N.W2d 267 (1942).
However, recovery may be denied if payee never received the check-Jones N. Banh of
America Nat. Trust & Savings Ass'n, 49 Cal. App.2d 115, 121 P.2d 94 (1942) ; but ci.
Ubowich v. Northern Trust Co., 281 Ill. App. 109 (1936); or delayed without reason in
pursuing his remedy-Annet v. Chase Nat. Bank, 196 App. Div. 63?, 183 N.Y. Supp. 7
(1921). On the payee's right to sue drawee, see Not, 2'j ST. J, lms L. RE%-. 1 #, (1951 1.
25. Recovery may be had in conversion: Good Roads Machinery Co. v. Broadway
Bank, 267 S.W. 40 (Mo. App. 1924) ; Zidek v. Forbes National Bank, 159 Pa. Sufpr.
442, 48 A.2d 103 (1946) ; Evenson v. Vaukesha Nat. Bank, 19 Wis. 170, 207 N.W. 415
(1926). In other jurisdictions recovery is in assumpsit: Merchants' & Manufacturers'
Ass'n v. First Nat Bank, 40 Ariz. 531, 14 P.2d 717 (1932) ; National Union Bank of Md.
v. Miller Rubber Co., 148 Md. 449, 129 At. 6u'8 (1925); Rv Eackr v. Ctmimcrcial State
Bank, 191 Minn. 553, 254 N.W. '4 (1934) ; Henderson v. Lincoln Rochester Trust Co.,
303 N.Y. 27, 100 N.E.2d 117 (1951). See also note 11 stfpra.
26. The theories are the same as in suits against collecting banks; ecu note 25 sutpra.
See Blacker & Shephard Co. v. Granite Trust Co., 284 Mass. 9, 187 N.E. 53 (1933)
(conversion); Universal Carloading & Distributing Co. Y. South Side Bank, 224 Mo.
App. 876, 27 S.W2d 768 (1930) (contract). See aho note 11 supra.
27. An instrument is payable to bearer when it is made out "payable to bearer," or
payable to a fictitious payee, or when the last indor.-ement is an indor.ement in blank.
NIL § 9. Delivery negotiates a bearer inbtrumient. NIL SO.
28. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Wells Fargo Bank & Trust Cu., 1 Cal. App2d
694, 37 P.2d 483 (1934) ; Mueller & Martin v. Liberty Ins. Bank, 187 Ky. 44, 218 S.W.
465 (1920) ; Snyder v. Corn Exchange Nat. Bank, 221 Pa. 599, 70 Ad. 876 (1908). See
also cases cited notes 51, 52, 115, 118 infra.
29. Although these cases are most frequently litigated between the drawer and the
drawee, the good faith purchaser has no less right to enforce payment than the drawee.
See the leading cases of Tatlock v. Harris [1789] 3 T.R. 174 (KtU. ; Minct v. Gib-
son [1789] 3 T.R. 481 (K-B.). Bearer paper can be enforced because nu endfirsemeut is
necessary to transfer title. NIL § 3U.
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was given as conditional payment.80 In the absence of an underlying debt the
true owner sustains the loss.
Material Alteration. Doctrines applied when an instrument is materially
altered usually place loss on the party who took the check from the forger.
but the extent of loss varies depending upon the nature of the alteration.
When the payee's signature is altered, the drawer is not liable on the check
at all.81 When the drawee pays or certifies, in some jurisdictions the drawee
sustains the loss, while in others all parties can fall back for recovery on prior
parties who negotiated the check to them,12 i.e., the drawee can recover from
the collecting bank and the latter can recover from the store who will then
bear the loss for the full face amount of the instrument. However, if the amount
of the check is altered, the drawer is usually liable for the original amount
either to the drawee 33 or to parties subsequent to the forgery who took the
check in good faith and for value. 34 As to the difference between the original
and altered amounts, courts again split on whether the drawee sustains
loss or whether parties may again fall back upon those who negotiated the
check to them until ultimately the taker from the forger will sustain loss.A0
30. See cases cited notes 10, 23 supra. But where the true owner requests that the
check be mailed and the check is stolen front the mail, he may be unable to recover front
the drawer. See Graves v. American Exchange Bank, 17 N.Y. 205 (1858) ; Smrrt, CAS rs
ON COan!ERCIAL AND INVESIIMENT PAPER 378-9 (1939).
31. Union Tool Co. v. Farmers' & Merchants' Nat. Bank, 192 Cal. 40, 218 Pac. 424
(1923). NIL § 124: "Where a negotiable instrument is materially altered without the
assent of all parties liable thereon, it is avoided, except as against a party who has him-
self made, authorized or assented to the alteration and subsequent indorsers."
32. The majority view favors drawee's right to recover. Interstate Trust Co. v. U.S.
National Bank, 67 Colo. 6, 185 Pac. 260 (1919); Central Nat. Bank v. F. W. Drosten
Jewelry Co., 203 Mo. App. 646, 220 S.W. 511 (1920); Bank of Commerce v. Union Bank,
3 N.Y. 230 (1850); National Reserve Bank v. Corn Exchange Bank, 171 App. Div. 195,
157 N.Y. Supp. 316 (1st Dep't 1916) ; cases cited note 35 infra. Contra: Crocker-
Woolworth Nat. Bank v. Nevada Bank, 139 Cal. 564, 73 Pac. 456 (1903) ; National City
Bank of Chicago v. National Bank of Republic, 300 Ill. 103, 132 N.E. 832 (1921), Com-
ment, 31 YALE L.J. 522 (1922); Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Corpus Christi Nat.
Bank, 186 S.W.2d 840 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944).
33. Glasscock v. First Nat Bank of San Angelo, 114 Tex. 207, 266 S.W. 393 (1924);
First State Bank of Lyford v. Parker, 27 S.W.2d 279 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930) ; 6 Zo-
IAN, BANKs & BAxXING 947-8 (1936).
34. People's Loan & Finance Corp. v. Latimer, 183 Ga. 809, 189 S.E. 899 (1937);
Smith, Kline & French Co. v. Freeman, 93 N.J.L. 45, 106 Atl. 22 (Sup. Ct. 1919); Sny-
der v. McEwen, 148 Tenn. 423, 256 S.W. 434 (1923) ; Cooper v. Hampton, 123 S.W.2d
941 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939).
NIL § 124 provides: "But when an instrument has been materially altered and is in
the hands of a holder in due course not a party to the alteration, he may enforce payment
thereof according to its original tenor." Whether person is holder in due course may be
a jury question. Miles City Bank v. Askin, 119 Mont. 581, 179 P.2d 750 (1947).
35. Compare McClendon v. Bank of Advance, 188 Mo. App. 417, 174 S.W. 203
(1915), New York Produce Exchange Bank v. Twelfth Ward Bank of City of New
York, 144 App. Div. 896, 128 N.Y. Supp. 1136 (1st Dep't 1911), reversed on other
grounds, 207 N.Y. 659, 100 N.E. 1131 (1912), with cases cited contra note 32 supra.
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Allocation Modified by Negligence Doctrines
Doctrines directed at placing liability on negligent parties frequently modify
allocation of loss based on types of forgery. The development of the!e modifi-
cations has been a patchwork affair typical of the case by case development
of common law.36 Some modifications, though originally based on negligence,
have hardened into absolute rules of liability applied without regard to the
particular conduct of the litigants.37 Elsewhere, standards of conduct, breach
of which are deemed negligence, vary greatly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction
and even from case to case within the same jurisdiction.38
While a drawee bank usually bears loss when it pays on a forged check,
negligence doctrines may shift the loss to others. In some states statutes pre-
scribe time limits, varying from one month to several years, within which the
purported drawer who has his account debited for the forged check must dis-
cover and report the forgery to the drawee bank.39 Failure to do so will pre-
clude the purported drawer from getting his account recredited; thus he,
rather than the drawee,40 will sustain the loss. Jurisdictions similarly hold
36. The fictitious payee doctrine tvolves from Tatleck v. Harris, [1789] 3 T.R_ 174
(K.B.) ;'Minet v. Gibson, [1789] 3 T.R. 481 (K.B.). The origins of the impostor rule
are difficult to trace. The earliest case may be Elliot v. Smitherman, 19 N.C. 33S (1837).
It was not applied in Tolman v. American Nat. Bank. 2 R.I. 462, 43 At. 480 (1901),
but soon after was again used in the United States. Sherman v. Corn Exchange Bank,
91 App. Div. 84,86 N.Y. Supp. 341 (1st Dep't 1904). The impostor rule was firmly estab-
lished by Boatsman v. Stockmen's Nat. Bank. 5to Colo. 495, 138 Pac. 764 (1914). Conceptions
of negligence of a depositor were advanced by Leather Manufacturers' Nat. Banl: v.
Morgan, 117 U.S. 96 (186); Critten v. Chemical Bank, 171 N.Y. 219, 63 N.E. 969
(1902).
37. See notes 39, 48-54, 139 140 infra.
38. For variance in effect of leaving blank signed checks accessible to others, see note
151 infra. Variance in depositor's duty to discover forged endorsement is discussed note
56 infra, duty to supervise business is discussed note 153 infra, and duty to e.xamine re-
turned checks is considered note 154 infra. Varying application of the impostor rule is
indicated at note 48 infra, and fictitious payee rule note 53 infra. For differing require-
ments for supervision of employees by payee, compare notes 62, 63 infra. For variance
in negligence exception to forged check rule, see note 46 infra.
39. The depositor's duty to e.xamine his returned checks in the early case of Critten
v. Chemical Nat. Bank, 171 N.Y. 219, 63 N.E. 969 (1902) (where depositor escaped lia-
bility) in some jurisdictions has become an absolute duty to report forgeries within a
prescribed time or suffer loss. See, e.g., Greensboro Ice & Fuel Co. v. Security Nat.
Bank, 210 N.C. 244, 186 S.E. 362 (1936). Statutory time limits vary. One month limit:
Oan Comp. LAws ANx. § 40-1009 (1940); 5 year limit: Anx. STxAT. § 37-269 (1947);
10 year limit: see Selected Kentucky Distillers v. Foloway, 124 IV. Va. 72, 19 S.E.2d
94 (1942). See also Note, 139 A.L.R. 1280. Additional statutes are collected in Comment,
6 ARK. L. REv. 199, 208 n.71 (1952).
40. Atwell v. Mercantile Trust Co., 95 Cal. App. 338, 272 Pac. 799 (1929); Win. M.
Barrett Inc. v. First Nat. Bank of Shreveport, 191 La. 945, 186 So. 741 (1939); Greens-
boro Ice & Fuel Co. v. Security Nat. Bank, 210 N.C. 244, 186 S.F. 362 (1936) ; Provident
Savings Bank & Trust Co. v. Fifth-Third Union Trust Co., 43 Ohio App. 533, 13 X.E.
885 (1932).
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the purported drawer liable for failure to discover and report within a
reasonable time by the use of doctrines of estoppel,41 ratification,4 2 breach of
contractual duty,43 or account stated.4 3 , But the negligence of the drawee
may preclude it from charging a negligent drawer's account.44 In addition,
many courts shift the loss on a forged check from the drawee to the collecting
bank if the collecting bank has been negligent in accepting the check.4 How-
ever, the standards of negligence vary.40 Here the drawee can recover from
41. First Nat. Bank of Union Bridge v. Wolfe, 140 Md. 478, 117 Atl. 898 (1922);
National Production Co. v. Guardian Nat. Bank, 281 Mich. 230, 274 N.V. 774 (1937);
Atlas Metal Works v. Republic Nat. Bank, 176 S.W.2d 350 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943);
cf. Johnson v. First Nat. Bank of Beaver Falls, 367 Pa. 459, 81 A.2d 95 (1951)
(dictum). Contra: First Nat. Bank v. Allen, 100 Ala. 476, 14 So. 335 (1893) ; House-
man-Spitzley Corp. v. American State Bank, 205 Mich. 268, 171 N.W. 543 (1919).
42. Montgomery v. Crossthwait, 90 Ala. 553, 8 So. 498 (1890); De Feriet v. Bank
of America, 23 La. Ann. 310 (1871); Coral Gables, Inc. v. Granara, 285 Mass. 565, 189
N.E. 604 (1934). Contra: First Nat. Bank v. Allen, 100 Ala. 476, 14 So. 335 (1893) ;
Marsh v. State Bank & Trust, 153 Tenn. 400, 284 S.W. 380 (1926). And see 1 WILUS-
TON, CONTRAcrs 813 (2d ed. 1936); 1 MEcHA¢, AGENCY §§ 360-3 (2d ed. 1914); Note,
31 YALE L.J. 598 (1922).
43. First Nat. Bank v. Allen, 100 Ala. 476, 14 So. 335 (1893) ; National Dredging
Co. v. President, etc., of Farmers' Bank of Delaware, 6 Pennewill 580, 69 At. 607 (Del.
1908). See also Neal v. First. Nat. Bank, 26 Ind. App. 503, 60 N.E. 164 (1901); Diamond
v. Southwestern Nat. Bank, 103 Pa. Super. 589, 157 AtI. 626 (1931).
43a. See Janin v. London & San Francisco Bank, 92 Cal. 14, 27 Pac. 1100 (1891);
Pannonia Building & Loan Ass'n v. West Side Trust Co., 93 N.JL. 377, 108 Atl. 240
(Ct. Err. & App. 1919). But cf. Worthen Bank & Trust Co. v. Kelly-Nelson Construction
Co., 245 S.W.2d 405 (Ark. 1952).
44. New York Produce Exchange Bank v. Houston, 169 Fed. 785 (2d Cir. 1909);
Frankini v. Bank of America Nat. Trust & Savings Ass'n, 31 Cal. App.2d 666, 88 P.2d
790 (1939); Gutfreund v. East River Nat. Bank, 251 N.Y. 58, 167 N.E. 171 (1929);
First Nat. Bank v. Patty, 62 S.W.2d 629 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933). See also note 158 inlfra.
45. Hutcheson Hardware Co. v. Planters' State Bank, 26 Ga. App. 321, 105 S.E.
854 (1921); Bank of Pulaski v. Bloomfield State Bank, 226 N.W. 119, .superceded by
210 Iowa 817, 232 N.W. 124 (1930); Ellis v. Ohio Life Ins. & Trust Co., 4 Ohio St. 628
(1855); Farmers' Nat. Bank of Augusta v. Farmers' and Traders' Bank of Maysville,
159 Ky. 141, 166 S.W. 986 (1914) ; National Bank of North America v. Bangs, 106 Mass.
441 (1871); First Nat. Bank v. First Nat. Bank, 299 S.W. 856 (Tex. Civ. App, 1927).
But if the drawee bank is also negligent it may not recover. San Francisco Nat. Bank
v. American Nat. Bank of Los Angeles, 5 Cal. App. 408, 90 Pac. 558 (1907) ; Commercial
& Savings Bank v. City Nat. Bank of Franklin, 68 Ind. App. 417, 120 N.E. 670 (1918) ;
First Nat. Bank of Portland v. United States Nat. Bank, 100 Ore. 264, 197 Pac. 547
(1921) ; Bank of Williamson v. McDowell County Bank, 66 W. Va. 545, 66 S.E. 761
(1909). For additional cases allowing recovery, see note 8 su pra and note 142 infra.
For cases contra, see note 143 infra.
46. Compare, e.g., the difficulty of satisfying the negligence standard established il
Citizens' Bank of Fayette v. J. Blach & Sons Inc., 228 Ala. 246, 153 So. 404 (1934)
(identification of forger by papers including railroad passes, cards, deputation to make
arrest and gold badge of railroad police; conduct bars recovery), with Commerce-
Guardian Bank v. Toledo Trust Co., 60 Ohio App. 337, 21 N.E.2d 173 (1938) (no identi-
fication in opening an account for forger; conduct does not bar recovery).
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the collecting bank. The latter, since it is usually the taker from the forger
in these situations, is left with an empty right to recover against the forger.
But the negligence of a party prior to the collecting bank will not enable the
drawee bank to recover against the collecting bank even though such a re-
covery would ultimately shift loss to the negligent party. 47
In cases involving forged endorsements, some negligence rules have been
over-generalized into rules imposing absolute liability on the drawer, thus re-
lieving the party who takes from the forger. For ex-ample, when a drawer
delivers a check to an impostor, courts hold that the signature by the impostor
-even though a forgery-has the effect of a valid endorsement.4s Thus a
drawee paying on the check can always debit the account of the drawer, and
the drawer is left with the right of recovery against the forger. The frequently
inarticulate premise 49 behind this "impostor rule" is the drawer's negligence
47. Germania Bank v. Boutell, 69 Minn. 189, 62 NA. 327 (1&95) (protects tal:er
who cashed $457 check for a man of little means in order to settle $10 account; purprted
drawer was in the same city); Fidelity & Casualty Co. of N.Y. v. Planenschecl, 200 Wis.
304, 227 NAV. 387 (1929) (protects taker who failed to notice that endorsement differed
from payee's name); cf. First Nat. Bank of Portland v. United States Nat. Ban!: of
Portland, 106 Ore. 264, 197 Pac. 547 (1921). But cf. Cairo Banking Co. v. West, 187 Ga.
666, 2 S.E.2d 91 (1939) (recovery by drawee permitted if any prior party negligent):
Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Pittsburg Pipe & Supply Co., 135 S.W.2d 818 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1940) (when all parties joined in suit drawee can sue prior parties).
48. Invocation of the impostor rule precludes the drawer from effectively asserting
the forged endorsement. It is applied when an impersonator has deceived the drawer into
issuing a check to him in the name of another person and then forges that name in order
to transfer the check. Continental-American Bank v. United States, 161 F2d 935, aff'd.
175 F2d 271 (5th Cir. 1949); Schweitzer v. Bank of America Nat. Trust & Savings
Ass'n, 42 Cal. App2d 536, 109 P.2d 441 (1941); Santa Maria v. Industrial City Ban!
& Banking Co., 326 Mass. 440, 95 N.E.2d 176 (1951) : Montgomery Garage Co. v. Manu-
facturers' Liability Insurance Co., 94 N.J.I. 152, 109 Atl. 295 (Sup. Ct. 1920) ; Halsey
v. Bank of New York & Trust Co., 270 N.Y. 134, 200 N.E. 671 (1936). Exceptions arise
in which the rule may not be applied: (1) where contact is through the mails--Mloore
v. Moultrie Banking Co., 39 Ga. App. 6S7, 14S S.E. 311 (1929); American Surety Co.
v. Empire Trust Co., 262 N.Y. 181, 186 N.E. 436 (1933) (Contra: Boatsman v. Stocanen's
National Bank, 56 Colo. 495, 138 Pac. 764 (1914) ; Uriola v. Twin Falls Bank & Trust
Co., 37 Idaho 332, 215 Pac. 10S0 (1923)) ; (2) where a confederate of the impostor malkes
the forgery-Russell v. Second Nat. Bank of Paterson, 136 N.J.L. 270, 55 A.2d 211
(1947) ; J. C. Hockett Co. v. Simmonds, 84 Ohio App. 467, 87 N.E2d 739 (1949) ; (3)
when there is no intent to give the proceeds to the impersonator-Internatinal Aircraft
Trading Co. v. Manufacturers' Trust Co., 297 N.Y. 285, 79 N.E.2d 249 (1948); Land
Title Bank & Trust Co. v. Cheltenham Nat. Bank, 362 Pa. 30, 66 A-2d 763 (1949); Storti
v. Industrial Trust Co., 75 R.I. 482, 67 A.2d 697 (1949). For historical development of
rule see note 36 supra.
49. The impostor rule has three justifications. The most frequently invoked rationale
is that the drawer intended the impostor to have the proceeds, and thus the forgery
actually served to implement the drawer's intent. Ryan v. Ban!: of Italy National Trust
& Savings Association, 106 Cal. App. 690, 289 Pac. 863 (1930); Greenberg v. A & D
Motor Sales Inc., 341 Ill. App. 85, 19 N.E2d 90 (1950); Robertson v. Coleman, 141
Mass. 231, 4 N.E. 619 (1886); Fiore v. Ladd, 22 Ore. 202, 29 Pac. 435 (1892). This
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in being duped by the impostor.50 Similarly, when a check is made out to a
fictitious payee and is cashed by "forging" the payee's endorsement, the drawer
is left in an identical situation. 1 These cases arise, for example, when an
employee authorized to write checks for his employer embezzles funds by
making checks out to nonexistent parties and endorsing them to his own use., 2
But aside from this situation, there is wide disagreement on the definition of
a "fictitious payee" check.58 In any event the basis for imposing liability on
rationale is unsound because the drawer has actually two intents: he intends to pay the
impostor, and he intends to pay the person being impersonated. The intent reasoning offers
no justification for honoring the first intent over the second. See Cohen v. Lincoln Sav-
ings Bank, 275 N.Y. 399, 407-8, 10 N.E.2d 457, 461 (1937) ; Note, 23 IND, L.J. 484 (1948).
The second basis is NIL § 61, which states that the drawer "admits the existence of the
payee and his then capacity to endorse; and engages that on due presentment the instru-
ment will be accepted or paid, or both. . . ." See Montgomery Garage Co. v. Mlanufac-
turers' Liability Ins. Co., 94 N.J.L. 152, 109 Atl. 296 (Sup. Ct. 1920). This rationale is
inadequate since the named payee may actually exist and be able to endorse, and so for-
gery by an impostor of the real person should have no more effect than any other forgery
under the NIL. See note 4 supra. The third rationale is that the drawer is liable because
his .negligence precludes asserting the forgery. See note 50 infra.
50. Cases discussing drawer's negligence include: United States v. National Ex-
change Bank, 45 Fed. 163 (1891) ; Central National Bank v. National Metropolitan Bank,
31 App. D.C. 391 (1908); Boatsman v. Stockmen's Nat. Bank, 56 Colo. 495, 138 Pae.
764 (1914); Cohen v. Lincoln Savings Bank, 275 N.Y. 399, 10 N.E.2d 457 (1937);
Forbes v. Espy, 21 Ohio St. 474 (1871) ; Land-Title & Trust Co. v. Northwestern Nat.
Bank, 196 Pa. 230, 46 Atl. 420 (1900). Note, [1950] WASH. U.L.Q. 130, 133. Unlike the
situation in which an impostor receives cash, when an impostor has obtained a cheek the
taker from the forger also has an opportunity to discover the fraud, and so the taker's
negligence should also be considered before application of the negligence rule against the
drawer. See Notes, 23 IND. L.J. 484 (1948), 7 WASu. & LEF L. REv. 94 (1950) : and
result of decision in International Aircraft Trading Co. v. Manufacturers' Trust Co., 297
N.Y. 285, 79 N.E.2d 249 (1948), 23 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 339 (1949).
51. Ellis Weaving Mills v. Citizens & Southern National Bank of Spartanburg, 91
F. Supp. 943, aff'd, 184 F.2d 43 (4th Cir. 1951) ; Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. San
Francisco Bank, 58 Cal. App.2d 528, 136 P.2d 853 (1943) ; Bourne v. Maryland Casualty
Co., 185 S.C. 1, 192 S.E. 605 (1937); cases cited notes 52, 115, 118 infra. For his-
torical development, see note 36 supra.
52. Choctaw Grain Co. v. First State Bank of Jet, 175 Okla. 458, 53 P.2d 579 (1936)
Litchfield Shuttle Co. v. Cumberland Valley National Bank, 134 Tenn. 379, 183 S.W.
1006 (1915) ; National Bank of Commerce v. Seattle National Bank, 109 Wash. 312, 187
Pac. 342 (1920); case cited note 118 infra. Contra: Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp.
v. Lincoln National Bank, 112 N.J.L. 550, 172 Atl. 45 (Sup. Ct. 1934).
53. If agent only supplies name of fictitious payee but does not sign check, check is
not "fictitious payee check." Robertson Banking Co. v. Brasfield, 202 Ala. 167, 79 So,
651 (1918) ; Edgington v. Security-First National Bank of Los Angeles, 78 Cal. App,2d
849, 179 P.2d 640 (1947); Johnston v. Exchange National Bank of Tampa, 152 Fla. 228,
9 So.2d 810 (1942) ; American Sash & Door Co. v. Commerce Trust Co., 332 Mo. 98, 56
S.W2d 1034 (1932) ; cases cited note 116 infra. Contra: Citizens Loan and Security
Co. v. Trust Co. of Georgia, 79 Ga. App. 184, 53 S.E.2d 179 (1949); Houghton-Mifflin
Co. v. Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust Co., 293 Ill. App. 423 (1938) ; Swift
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the employer is his presumed failure to exercise adequate supervision over
his employees.54
In forged endorsement cases there are also flexible negligence doctrines
that shift loss to the drawer and away from the party who takes from the
forger. As in the case of a forged check, failure of the drawer to discover
and report a forgery to the drawee may estop him from having his account
recredited.55 However, his "duty to discover and report" is less than the duty
in forged check cases.50 Additionally, the drawer's carelessness in delivering
and Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 280 N.Y. 135, 19 N.E.2d 992 (1939). And see cases cited
note 115 infra. Where one of two authorized signers knew fictitious nature of payee,
same result. Security Savings Bank v. First National Bank, 105 F.2d 542 (6th Cir. 1939) ;
Board of Education v. National Union Bank of Dover, 121 X.J.L 177, 1 A.24 3,3 ICt.
Err. & App. 1938). Contra: Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Vells Fargo Bank & Union
Trust Co., 1 Cal. App.2d 694, 37 P.2d 483 (1934) ; Noel v. Security Ban!: of Ohicag&,
163 Ill. App. 82 (1911); Globe Indemnity Co. v. First National Ban: in St. Louis, 133
SAV2d 1066 (Mo. App. 1939); National Surety Corp. v. Federal Reserve Bank, 161
Misc. 304, 292 N.Y. Supp. 607 (Sup. Ct 1936), aff'd. 250 App. Div. 754, 296 N.Y. Supp.
240 (1st Dep't 1937). See Note, 26 Nn. L RE-v. 436 (1947).
54. See American Hominy Co. v. Millikin National Bank, 273 Fed. 550 (S.D. Ill.
1920); Defiance Ltimber Co. v. Bank of California, 180 Wash. 533, 41 P2d 135 (1935).
See Comment, 18 U. OF Cm. L. REv. 281 (1921).
The fictitious payee rule originated to place the loss on the person who drew an in-
strument on his own funds; thus it was always the conduct of the owner of funds which
caused his loss. Tatlock v. Harris, [1789] 3 T.R. 174 (K.1.). When it %,as early -
gested in the modern check conte-t as a device to place the loss on an owner of fund5
whose dishonest employee supplied fictitious names to his employer, it was denied. Ship-
man v. Bank of State of New York, 126 N.Y. 318, 27 N.E. 371 (1891). But when the
employer had given his employee authority to sign the checks, courts applied the rule
even though the signer was not owner of the funds. Snyder v. Corn Exchange Nat. Ban!:,
221 Pa. 599,70 Atl. 876 (1908). In its modern application the rule reaches even the Shipman
facts regardless of the absence of negligence of the owner of funds. Swift & Co. v. Chemical
Bank & Trust Co., 280 N.Y. 135, 19 N.E. 992 (1939).
55. United States v. National City Bank of N.Y.. 2 F. Supp. 144 t S.D.N.Y. 1939#
(laches); Royal Indemnity Co. v. Federal Rk-vrve Bank. 3, F. Supl'. €,21 (S.D. Ohi..
1939), aff'd, 119 F2d 778 (6th Cir. 1941) (two year delay after discovery bars without
showing of detriment by defendant); Union Trust Co. v. Soble, 64 A2d 744 (.Md. 1949)
(estoppel even if no detriment to defendant although here there vas some detriment) ;
Scott v. First Nat. Bank, 343 Mo. 77, 119 S.W.2d 929 (1938) (after knowledge that there
weas shortage of $10,000 employer estopped from recovering on subsequent forged endorse-
ments) ; Connors v. Old Forge Discount & Deposit Bank, 245 Pa. 97, 91 At. 210 (19141
(43 day delay after discovering forgery bars recovery even if no prejudice to defendantj.
56. No duty to examine endorsement to discover forgery: First Nat. Bank uf Atiat,-t
v. American Surety Co., 71 Ga. App. 112, 30 S.E2d 402 (1944) ; Wormhoudt Lumber
Co. v. Union Bank & Trust Co., 231 Iowa 928, 2 NAV2d 267 (1942) ; Jordan Marsh
Co. v. National Shawmut Bank, 210 Mass. 397, 87 N.E. 740 (1909); National Suret
Co. v. President and Directors of Manhattan Co., 252 N.Y. 247, 169 N.E. 372 (1929).
No duty even when the payees' signature is in draver's p.,sessivn: LiLTrty Mutual liik
Co. v. First Nat. Bank in Dallas, - Tex. -, 245 S.AV.2d 237 (1951); Board of
Education v. National Union Bank of Dover, 121 X.J.L 177, 1 A.2d 33 (Ct Err. & App.
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a check, as by improper mailing, will lead some courts to place the loss upon
him rather than upon the taker from the forger.51 And negligence in super-
vision of employees and agents, aside from the fictitious payee situations, may
also result in the drawer's liability. 8 Some courts refuse to hold the drawer
liable for negligent supervision, however, on the theory that the forger's illegal
action arising after the negligence is the real cause of loss.59 In each of the
foregoing situations where negligence is considered an operative fact, the
drawer is unable to compel recrediting of his account and thus generally re-
mains with the right of action against the forger.
Losses from forged endorsements may also shift to the true owner where
he is negligent. When the negligence of the true owner is considered operative,
it will bar all or part of his recovery from any party except the forger, Thus
a true owner who discovers but fails to give notice of a forged endorsement
will bear the entire loss in some jurisdictions, 60 while in others he will be
held liable only for the portion of loss resulting from his failure to notify.6t
1938) (some forged endorsements were of depositor's own signature). Contra: Royal
Indemnity Co. v. Federal Reserve Bank, 38 F. Supp. 621 (S.D. Ohio 1939), aff'd, 110
F.2d 778 (6th Cir. 1941). Statutes requiring depositor to report forgery to bank within
given time generally are not applicable to forged endorsements. Atwell v. Mercantile Trust
Co., 95 Cal. App. 338 (1928) ; McCornack v. Central State Bank, 203 Iowa 883, 211 N.W.
542 (1926) ; Board of Education v. National Union Bank of Dover, supra; Kleinman v.
Chase Nat. Bank, 124 Misc. 173, 207 N.Y. Supp. 191 (Sup. Ct. 1924).
57. Keck v. Browne, 314 Ky. 151, 234 S.W.2d 183 (1950), 39 Ky. L.J. 476 (1951)
Slattery & Co. v. National City Bank of New York, 114 Misc. 48, 186 N.Y. Supp. 679
(Sup. Ct. 1920); Weisberger Co. v. Barberton Savings Bank, 84 Ohio St. 21, 95 N.E.
379 (1911). Majority view is contra: Cochran v. Atchison, 27 Kan. 728 (1882) ; Beattie
v. National Bank of Illinois, 174 Ill. 571, 51 N.E. 602 (1898); Thomas v. First Nat. Bank
of Gulfport, 101 Miss. 500, 58 So. 478 (1912) ; Vecchia v. Fidelity Union Trust Co., 114
N.J.L. 470, 177 AUt. 429 (Sup. Ct. 1935) ; Market Street Title & Trust Co. v. Chelten
Trust Co., 296 Pa. 230, 145 At. 848 (1929).
58. Negligent conduct barring recovery includes the rehiring of a known embezzler,
De Feriet v. Bank of America, 23 La. Ann. 310 (1871) ; the failure to discover why costs
have suddenly increased, Detroit Piston Ring Co. v. Wayne County & Home Savings
Bank, 252 Mich. 163, 233 N.W. 185 (1930); and the permitting of an agent to endorse
checks in customers' names, Bartlett v. First Nat. Bank of Chicago, 247 I11. 490, 93 N.E.
337 (1910).
59. Fitzgibbons Boiler Co. v. National City Bank, 287 N.Y. 326, 39 N.E.2d 897
(1942); Provident Savings Bank & Trust Co. v. Western & Southern Life Insurance
Co., 41 Ohio App. 261, 179 N.E. 815 (1931) ; Land-Title Bank & Trust Co. v. Chelten-
ham Nat. Bank, 362 Pa. 30, 66 A.2d 768 (1949); Glasscock v. First Nat. Bank of San
Angelo, 114 Tex. 207, 266 S.W. 393 (1924). Contra: Connecticut Savings Bank of N.H. v.
First Nat. Bank and Trust Co., 138 Conn. 298, 84 A.2d 267 (1951). '
60. Brown v. People's National Bank, 170 Mich. 416, 136 N.W. 506 (1912); Annet
v. Chase National Bank, 196 App. Div. 632, 188 N.Y. Supp. 7 (1st Dep't 1921); Marks
v. Anchor Savings Bank, 252 Pa. 304, 97 At. 399 (1916); State v. First National Bank
of Montrose, 203 Pa. 69, 52 At. 13 (1902). Contra: Independent Oil Men's Ass'n v. Fort
Dearborn National Bank, 311 Ill. 278, 142 N.E. 458 (1924).
61. Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943) ; Lindenthal v. North-




Additionally, the true omner may sustain the entire loss when inadequate
supervision of his employees and agents contributed to the successful forgeryf'2
But as in the case of a drawer's negligent supervision, courts vary widely in
determining the surveillance required. 63
In altered check cases, loss created by the alteration may fall on a negligent
drawer rather than the party taking the check from the forger. Thus, if a
drawer makes alteration easy by writing his check in pencil C- or with large
spaces on the line on which the amount is indicated, 5 some courts will hold
him liable for the changed amount.
Allocation Modified by Availability of Defenses
A generally unintended but nevertheless significant factor influencing al-
location of forgery losses is the unavailability of certain defenses to some de-
fendants. Generally, substantive issues such as the rule for a particular type of
forgery or the negligence of parties may be pleaded as a defense when re-
covery is sought on the check. The effects of these issues on allocation of loss
have already been discussed in prior sections. However, in certain situations
the law will not permit some of these issues to be raised.
Waiver of a defense by one party may prevent the assertion of the defense
by another party. For example, a drawer's failure to give timely notice of a
forged or altered instrument to the drawee bank would bar his recovery from
62. General Cigar Co. v. First Nat. Bank of Portland, 290 Fed. 143 (9th Cir. 1923);
Strickland Transportation Co. v. First State Bank of Memphis, 214 S.W. 2d 934 (Te.
1948). Sometimes payee's recovery is denied on rationale that his agent had apparent
authority to endorse. Kansas City Ml. & B.R. Co. v. Ivy Leaf Coal Co., 97 Ala. 705, 12 So.
395 (1892); Indemnity Mutual Marine Assurance Co. v. Powell, 216 Mo. App. 673, 271
S.V. 538 (1925) ; Morris v. Hofferberth, 81 App. Div. 512, S1 N.Y. Supp. 403 (1st Dep't
1903), aff'd, 73 N.E. 1127 (1903). See also Fidelity & Casualty Co. of N.Y. v. First Nat.
Bank & Trust Co. of Fargo, 71 N.D. 413, 1 N.W.2d 401 (1941) ; cases cited note 12 sutra.
63. Compare cases in note 62 svpra, wzth the following: l:lacler & Shephard Co. v.
Granite Trust Co., 284 fass. 9, 187 N.E. 53 (1933) (payee company's vice-president made
unauthorized endorsement) ; Hart v. Moore, 171 Miss. 833, 153 So. 490 (1935) (payee re-
covers despite dishonest agent) ; Universal Carloading & Distributing Co. v South Side
Bank, 224 Mlo. App. 876, 27 S.W2d 763 (1930) (payee recovers from one who too k from
dishonest employee); Burstein v. People's Trust Co., 143 App. Div. 165, 127 N.Y. Supp.
1092 (1st Dep't 1911) (payee recovers from one who took from dishonest agent despite
inability to recover from drawer).
64. Harvey v. Smith, 55 Ill. 224 (1870); Foutch v. Alexandria Bank & Trust Co.,
177 Tenn. 348, 149 S.V.d 76 (1941). Contra: Walsh v. Hunt, 1Z Cal. 46, 52 Pac. 115
(1398) ; Commercial Bank v. Arden & Fraley, 177 Ky. 520, 197 S.W. 951 (1917) ; Lanier
v. Clarke, 63 Tex. Civ. App. 266, 133 S.W. 1093 (1910). Problem discussed in Notes,
23 CoL L. REv. 184 (1923), 32 YALE L. J. 413 (1923}.
65. Young v. Grote, [1827] 4 Bing. 253; Yocum v. Smith, 3 111. 321 kl 71l); Hac:eit
v. First Nat. Bank, 114 Ky. 193, 70 S.W. 664 (1902); Garrard v. Haddan, 07 Pa. ,2
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the bank, and place the loss on the drawer.00 But if the drawee bank chooses
to waive the defense and recredit the drawer's account, in a subsequent suit
by the drawee bank against a collecting bank, the drawer's delay in notifica-
tion would be no defense for the collecting bank. 7 Nor could the collecting
bank, having refunded money on the check, recover from the drawer."8 In
another situation, where a collecting bank can resist suit by a drawee bank
because the latter paid a forged instrument, 9 if the collecting bank chooses
to refund payment to the drawee, it may successfully sue the party who pre-
sented the check for collection.70 The presenter would not be able to raise the
defense that the drawee bank had paid on the check, nor could the presenter
later sue the drawee.
Even when the party against whom a defense is asserted is before the court,
particular defendants may be barred from raising the defense. This
occurs, for example, where a drawer who failed to give timely notice to
the drawee of a forged endorsement or alteration sues a collecting bank 1
(1870) ; National Bank v. Nolting, 94 Va. 263, 26 S.E. 826 (1897). Contra: The Knox-
ville Nat. Bank v. Clark, 51 Iowa 264 (1879); Cape Ann Nat. Bank v. Burns, 129 Mass.
596 (1880); National Exchange Bank v. Lester, 194 N.Y. 461, 87 N.E. 779 (1909):
Searles v. Seipp, 6 S.D. 472, 61 N.W. 804 (1895). See Note, 31 HAv. L. Rzv. 779 (1918).
66. See notes 39-43a supra.
67. Fallick v. Amalgamated Bank of N.Y., 232 App. Div. 127, 249 N.Y. Supp. 238
(1st Dep't 1931); National Surety Corp. v. Federal Reserve Bank, 188 Misc. 207, 70
N.Y.S.2d 636 (Sup. Ct. 1946); American Exchange Nat. Bank v. Yorkville Bank, 122
Misc. 616, 204 N.Y. Supp. 621 (Sup. Ct. 1924). But cf. First State Bank & Trust Co.
v. First Nat. Bank of Canton, 314 Ill. 269, 145 N.E. 382 (1924) ; Merchants' Nat. Bank
v. Federal State Bank, 206 Mich. 8, 172 N.W. 390 (1919). An act to allow the collecting
bank to avail itself of the protection was passed by the New York Legislature in 1949,
but the Governor vetoed it.
68. Manufacturers' Bank of Cohoes v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 102 Misc. 339,
168 N.Y. Supp. 913 (Sup. Ct. 1918).
69. See discussion at note 17 supra.
70. The collecting bank's right of action is on the warranty given by the endorser.
See notes 5, 9 vupra. This warranty does not run to the drawee; so the latter may not be
able to sue the prior party. See note 47 supra.
71. The right of drawer to sue collecting bank is based on theories of (1) conversion:
Home Indemnity Co. v. State Bank of Fort Dodge, 233 Iowa 103, 8 N.W.2d 757 (1943);
Decker v. Mathews, 12 N.Y. 313 (1855) ; or (2) subrogation to drawee's claim: Wash-
ington Mechanics' Savings Bank v. District Title Ins. Co., 65 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir, 1933) ;
Gustin-Bacon Mfg. Co. v. First Nat. Bank of Englewood, 306 Ill. 179, 137 N.E. 793
(1922), 36 Hagv. L. REv. 879 (1923); Life Ins. Co. of Virginia v. Edisto Nat. Bank of
Orangeburg, 166 S.C. 505, 165 S.E. 178 (1932) (to avoid circuity of action); National
Surety Co. v. City Bank & Trust Co., 248 Wis. 32, 20 N.W.2d 559 (1945) (recovery
denied because drawer had received proceeds of check) ; or (3) money had and received:
Figuers v. Fly, 137 Tenn. 358, 193 S.W. 117 (1917) ; United States Fidelity & Guaranty
Co. v. First Nat Bank of tEl Paso, 93 S.W.2d 562 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936). Suit is not
permitted by some states on the theory that the collecting bank did not receive drawer's
funds since drawer has right to have his account with drawee bank recredited. California
Mill Supply Corp. v. Bank of America, 36 Cal.2d 334, 223 P.2d 849 (1950); Lavanier
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Though his delay would prevent recovery against the drawee bank, the de-
fense can not be raised by the collecting bank -.72 Also where a taker from
the forger was negligent in taking a forged check, and then procesied it
through a collecting bank, the drawee cannot recover from the negligent taker
even if the latter is before the court7 3
EVALUATION OF CURRENT METHODS OF ALLOCATING Loss
Standards for Evaluation: Objectivcs in Loss Allocation
The overall goal in allocation of forgery losses is to serve the commercial
community by utilizing doctrines which encourage and facilitate good business
practices and which allocate losses as equitably as possible. To achieve these
results, four specific objectives have been suggested by courts and commen-
tators: promotion of transferability.74 placing loss on the best risk bearer,7 5
v. Cosmopolitan Bank & Trust Co., 36 Ohio App. 285, 173 N.E. 216 (1929) ; First Nat.
Bank of Bloomingdale v. North Jersey Trust Co., 18 N.J. Misc. 449, 14 A2d 765 (Sup Ct.
1940) ; Trojan Pub. Corp. v. Manufacturers' Trust Co., 117 N.Y.LJ. 1914 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
aff'd e n., 273 App. Div. 843, 76 N.Y.S2d 845, aff'd mem., 293 N.Y. 771, 83 N.E2d 465
(1948). See Corker, Risk of Loss from Forged Indorsements, 4 STAiz. L. REv. 24 (1951):
cases cited note 178 infra.
72. National Surety Co. v. President and Directors of Manhattan Co., 252 N.Y. 247,
169 N.E. 372 (1929); Fallick v. Amalgamated Bank of N.Y., 232 App. Div. 127, 249
N.Y. Supp. 238 (1st Dep't 1931); American Exchange Nat. Bank v. Yorkville Ban!:.
122 Misc. 616, 204 N.Y. Supp. 621 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 210 App. Div. S85, 205 N.Y. Supp.
879 (1st Dep't 1924). See Note, Liability of Collecting Bank to Drawer frr Paynent
on Forged Indorsement. 49 MrcH. L. REV. 1216 (1951).
73. See cases cited note 47 supra.
74. Courts have explicitly considered the promotion of transferability: United States
v. First Nat. Bank, 131 F.2d 985 (10th Cir. 1942). cert. den.. 318 U.S. 774 (1943) (sub-
jugation of Federal Government checks to impostor rule to promote their transferability).
In the leading case on the forged endorsement rule Chief Justice Kenyon spaking for the
minority in opposition to the rule pointed out that "it would throw too great a burden
on persons taking bills of exchange to require proof of an indorsee that the person from
whom he received the bill was the real payee." Mead v. Young, [1790] 4 T.R. 2s, Z0 (K.B.).
Recently Justice Garwood pointed out: "It is still more likely that such immunity on the
part of drawee banks will result in a loss of public confidence in the present highly useful
system of 'pay by check' which banks have done so much to promote." Strickland Transp.
Co. v. First State Bank of Memphis, 147 Tex. 193, 217, 214 S.W d 934, 943 (1948) (dis-
sent). See discussions in Notes, 27 i,. LJ. 5d, .3 (1952), 81 U. or PL. L. Rmw. 017
(1933), [1950] W.sHa. U.L.Q. 130, 133 (1950).
75. For suggestions of this policy see Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Planenscheck, 200 WVis.
304, 227 N.W. 387 (1929) ; STEFFEN. C.VsEs .x Cor-. IncIM.. AD IN,_T:,"!.T PwAFm 420
(1939) ; Beutel, The Proposed Uniform (?) Counnercial Code Should Not be Adopted,
61 YALE L.J. 334, 358-9, 361 (1952) ; Corker, Rish of Loss from Forged Indorsements, 4
STAx. L. RLv. 24, 30-1 (1951) ; Kessler. Forged Endorsements, 47 YI.U, UJ. 3, 896-7
(1938) ; Note, Liability of Bank for Frauds of Depositor's Employee, 14 U. o- CHL I Rcv.
705 (1947) ; Comment, Share certificate Negotiability, 7 U. op Cut. L. REv. 497 (1940).
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placing loss on the negligent party,70 and uniformity of result in application
of the preceding standards.
77
Promoting Transferability. If checks are to serve as popular documents for
both payment and circulation, parties must be able to transfer them with a
minimum of formal requirements. 78 For example, the check becomes a more
efficient business device as formal requirements attaching to transfer decrease,
for time and effort are valuable assets in the commercial world. And since
most checks circulate to some extent-at least through the banking system
in the collection process 79-simplicity of transfer as a catalyst in commercial
transactions becomes even more significant.
The extent to which checks will be useful to the community also depends
upon the protection afforded to parties who take them for value in good
faith. Inevitably, parties will be more willing to accept checks if they are
reasonably certain that they will not sustain either the loss of the value of the
instrument or expenses of litigation.8 0 Similarly, from the standpoint of cir-
culation, protection of banks dealing with checks in the collection process will
expedite that process by diminishing the number of times parties must fall
back on prior negotiators when they cannot obtain payment.8 ' In terms of
76. An early expression of the policy was made by Lord Mansfield: "Each party is
innocent [of the forgery crime]; the question is, on whom the loss must fall ?-it should
be on him who is most in fault." Smith v. Shepperd, Hil. Term 16 Geo. III (1776). The
search for the negligent party exists in many types of forgery situations. See e.g., notes
39-45, 49-58, 60, 63 stpra. For discussion, see Kessler, supra note 75, at 897: Comment,
Fictitious Payee & the U.C.C., 18 U. OF Cm. L, Rav. 281, 288 (1951).
77. Desire for uniformity suggested Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S,
363 (1943). See STEFFEN, op. cit. supra note 75, at App. viii-ix; Sherman, Dra'ccs Liability
for Retention of a Check Verss the Pennsylvania NIL, 12 U. oF PrTr. L. Rav. 522
(1951).
78. Banks rely on the ready transferability of checks to promote use of checking
accounts. See, e.g., THE WOMAN AND HER BANK (1951) distributed by the Union & New
Haven Trust Co. urging use of checks because of "the convenience of being able to pay bills
by check and of exchanging checks for cash wherever you are known." See also note 74
sipra.
79. Over five billion checks circulate annually in the United States. Wood, Banik
Forgery Hazard, 32 PROTECriVE BULLLrIN No. 8 (1940). As of 1941 $537,398,000,000
annually was debited by banks on checks written by depositors. BRIT'ON, BILLS AND NOTES
1-2 (1943).
80. This has been one of the justifications for the forged instrument rule. WOODWARD,
THE LAW OF QUAsI-CoNTRACTS §§ 80-7 (1933). Justice Poffenbarger urges: "I adhere
to the rule declared in Price v. Neal .... Lack of this rule would not only impede com-
mercial transactions, but also introduce unnecessary and grave elements of uncertainty and
danger, and render the whole commercial system unstable and treacherous as well as too
slow to meet ordinary business demands.' Bank of Williamson v. McDowell County Bank,
66 W. Va. 545, 553-4, 66 S.E. 761, 765 (1909). The impostor rule taking the loss from
transferees has also been justified to reduce loss of parties taking checks. Continental-
American Bank v. United States, 161 F.2d 935 (5th Cir. 1947), aff'd on rehearing, 175 F.2d
271 (5th Cir..1949).
81. Transferability is favored by closing transactions. National Bank of Sanford v.
Marshburn, 229 N.C. 104, 27 S.E.2d 793 (1048). Justice Holmes regarded the forged
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allocating loss, protecting the purchaser shifts the risk of loss to the true
owner, the drawee bank, or the drawer. This may create double liability for
the drawer: liability on the instrument to subsequent parties, and liability tu
the true owner on the underlying obligation for which the drawer gave the
check as conditional payment.8 2 When the true owner cannot recoup from
the drawer, the ultimate risk of loss would fall on him.s 3 However, while it
is true that protection of the taker makes parties more willing to accept checks,
when it entails a drawer's double liability, it may hinder transferability by
discouraging drawers from making payments by check." This suggests that
the promotion of transferability may also entail some limitation of the drawer's
liability.
Placing loss on the best risk bearer. In recent years the widespread use of
insurance has led to suggestions that courts seek out the institutions which
can most readily insure against forgery losses and pass the cost of insurance
on to those who share in the protection.85 Providing security against loss and
equitably distributing the social cost of the check both justify such risk dis-
tribution. When loss is placed on a part), who has insured against it, no one
loses the total amount of the instrument. Nor do parties run the risk of
sustaining loss because of the insolvency of prior parties associated with the
check. It has been suggested, however, that centering loss on insured parties
will lead to higher rates for insurance which the insured will be forced to pay.6
instrument rule as based on the desire to close commercial transactions. Dedham Nat. Bank
v. Everett Nat. Bank, 177 Mass. 392. 59 N.E. 62 (1901). Transferability has also b--en
offered as justification for refusing recovery by a drawee bank from prior parties on
payment creating an overdraft. Spokane & Eastern Trust Co. v. Huff, 63 Wash. 225,
115 Pac. 80 (1911).
82. This might arise, for example, where negligent mailing makes the drawer liable
on the instrument. See note 57 supra. His debt to the intended payee remains undischarged.
See notes 10, 23 supra. Where the drawer was not negligent he may be protected against
double liability. McFadden v. Follrath, 114 Minn. 85, 130 N.W. 542 (1911) (payee's action
must be against drawee not drawer) ; see note 30 supra.
83. See cases cited notes 12, 23, 62 supra.
84. The civil law jurisdictions adhering to the Geneva Code have ensured ready
transferability by creating a system in which a forger can convey good title. The
good faith purchaser of an instrument with a forged endorsement obtains an enforceable
title against all parties liable on the instrument. GEunvA CEDE Arts. 7, 16, 40, 69.
See United States v. Guaranty Trust Co., 293 U.S. 340 (1934) (forgery in Yugoslavia
on check issued in the United States passed valid title to subsequent holder under Yugoslav
law). The suggestion that this continental solution of allowing a forgery to pass good
title restricts issuance of checks is made by Chalmers in L-LGUE o NATI0NS, U'IICATION
OF LAws RELATiXG To BiLLs OF ExCHANGE, AND PRUMliSSVR " NoTEs 103 (1923); Kessler.
supra note 75, at 895. There is no question that checks are much less used on the continent
than in the United States, but the causal relationship has never been established. Ibd.
85. See note 75 supra.
86. George W. Adlam, Manager, Insurance Department of the Todd Company reports,
"All of these bonds [Banker's Bllanket Bond] are written on what we term an experience
rating. That is, at the end of each premium year, the experience of the bank is analyzed,
19531
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But in so far as the risk bearer can distribute the costs among check
users, the expense will in fact be shared ratably by many who benefit from
the insurance.
In terms of loss allocation, choice of the best risk bearer would shift loss
to the drawee bank.8 7 The bank, in charging rates for commercial accounts,
can pass on the cost of insurance to those drawing checks in proportion
to the number of checks they use. 8 While subsequent takers may share in
the protection afforded without sharing in the cost, (except, of course, as
they themselves draw checks), drawers and drawees gain not only the direct
protection from the possibility of loss but also benefit indirectly from the
assurance afforded to transferees, since people will be more willing to take
checks from drawers if the risk of loss is diminished.
Other parties are not able to gather and distribute the risk as effectively
as the drawee bank. If drawers or all transferees sought to protect them-
selves independently, the multiplicity of policies would increase the total ad-
ministrative costs of the insurance. 89 For, in addition to the drawee, only a
and if they have had a very bad experience, and the insurance company has been forced
to pay considerable losses, the premium is upped. If their experience has been good, the
premium goes down. I haven't available the exact figures, because it is practically tailor-
made for each individual bank." Communication from George W. Adlam to YaLE LAW
JOURNAL, dated Mar. 27, 1952, on file in Yale Law Library.
87. Banks insure against forgery losses by taking out the Banker's Blanket Bond.
The history of its development is reported in Boardman, Proper Construction of the So-
Called "Bankers Ainendinent" to Section 9(3) of the Negotiable Instruient Act, 17 I2s.
CouN. J. 166 (1950). Forgery losses covered by the Banker's Blanket Bond include:
any loss through forgery or alteration of checks including checks made payable to a ficti-
tious payee and endorsed in the name of the fictitious payee, or checks procured in a face
to face transaction with the drawer or his agent by anyone impersonating another and
drawn payable to the one impersonated and endorsed by any one else than the one imper-
sonated. Mechanically reproduced signatures are treated the same as handwritten signatures.
AmERIcAN SURETY COMPANY OF NEw YORK, BANKER'S BLANKET BOND, STANDAiD FORM
No. 24 (rev. to June, 1951). Extent of insurance indicated note 90 iftfra.
88. Banks assess charges for checking accounts. New Haven banks charge a main-
tenance charge of 50 cents per month plus 8 cents for each deposit, 2 cents for checks
deposited for collection on local banks, 3 cents for checks deposited on out-of-town banks,
and 4 cents for each check drawn on the account. Additional charges are made for special
services such as certifying check- 25 cents, stop-payment-50 cents, return depositor's
check-1.00, check deposited and later returned unpaid-25 cents. Provisions for increasing
rates are embodied in the depositor's contract approved by the American Bankers Associa-
tion: "New service and maintenance charges and changes in existing charges shall become
effective upon the posting of notice in the office of this bank for a period of ten days and the
publication thereof in any local newspaper before the end of such period, or upon giving
the depositor not less than ten days' notice in writing mailed to his last known address."
Thus added costs of insurance could be passed on through these charges to the users of
checking accounts. See Kessler, supra note 75, at 896.
89. The cost of an insurance policy is the function of three factors-risk of loss, rate
of return on insurer's investments, and administration expenses. Comment, Cost and Cover-
age of Industrial Life lnsurance, 61 YALE L.J. 46, 50 n.26 (1952). Since the risk and rate
of return are not variables, increased administration costs will lead to higher insurance
rates. See id. at 55.
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collecting bank is in a position to cover so many instruments by one insurance
policyY0 But even the collecting bank is not in as favorable a position as the
drawee bank to pass on the cost of the protection equitably. While the collect-
ing bank could include the expense in the charges made to transferees for
90. A study of 619 banks maintaining insurance against forgery loss on negotiable
paper disclosed:
Nmnber of bans Average wnber of
protected k, aclt,e chcc1ng accounts


































$,500,000,000 up 9 36,194
Source: Mendenhall, Bankers Blanket Bonds Protecting Banks Whose Deposits Ex-
ceed $5,000,000 in Towxn- RATiNG BuREAu (1943).
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handling checks for deposit,9 1 it is not able to shift the cost to drawers in
proportion to the number of instruments they create.
Placing loss on negligent parties. Placing the loss on negligent parties is
justified by considerations of equity and by the desire to enforce sound business
practices. Courts have strongly responded to the appeal that where neither of
two parties had actual knowledge of a forgery, "fairness" dictates that the one
who carelessly contributed to the possibility of loss should sustain the loss. 0 2
In addition, emphasis has been placed on inducing adherence to sound busi-
ness practices by placing loss on those who fail to exercise a reasonable stand-
ard of care.93 It is true that judicial standards developed in forgery cases
only partially induce careful conduct. Other factors such as a desire to avoid
the inconvenience and loss from taking checks drawn on insufficient funds may
equally prompt parties to exercise care, for example, in requiring identifica-
tion from check transferors. And entirely aside from forgery negligence doc-
trines, parties may simply desire to conform to existing conceptions of proper
business methods. Nevertheless, there is ample evidence that standards of
conduct developed in forgery cases do substantially affect behavior in the
business world.
Two distinct types of negligence doctrines are available to adjust loss ac-
cording to negligence. On the one hand, doctrines may be based on reasonable
conduct and embody sufficient flexibility to allow the decisions to turn on the
91. Banks do make a charge for collecting checks deposited in checking accounts. See
note 88 supra. However, no similar charges are generally made for checks deposited for
collection in savings accounts.
92. See Royal Indemnity Co. v. Federal Reserve Bank, 38 F. Supp. 621 (S.D. Ohio
1939), aff'd, 119 F2d 778 (6th Cir. 1941) (where 3d person's fraud results in loss, party
who first reposed confidence must bear loss) ; Keck v. Browne, 314 Ky. 151, 234 S.W.2d
183 (1950) (place loss on negligent drawer in interest of fairness) ; see note 76 .rupra.
93. See, e.g., Defiance Lumber Co. v. Bank of Cal., 180 Wash. 533, 41 P.2d 135
(1935) (use of payroll procedures capable of being padded) ; Couture v. Ocean Park Bank,
205 Cal. 338, 270 Pac. 943 (1928) (ambiguous instrument construed against drawer);
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. First Nat. Bank of Denver, 95 Colo. 34, 32 P2d 268
(1934) (not taking audit to discover reason for losses) ; Bartlett v. First Nat. Bank, 247
Ill. 490, 93 N.E. 337 (1910) (permitting agent to endorse checks in customers' names
made drawer liable); Erickson Co. v. Iowa Nat. Bank, 211 Iowa 495, 230 N.W. 342 (1930)
(inadequate supervision of employees); Herbel v. Peoples State Bank of Ellinwood, 170
Kan. 620, 228 P2d 929 (1951) (place loss on negligent drawee bank to enforce good bank-
ing practice despite depositor's subsequent negligence) ; Bank of Williamson v. McDowell
County Bank, 66 W. Va. 545, 66 S.E. 761 (1909) (drawee bank did not have a signature of
its depositor on file to compare against checks).
Publications of the Secret Service directed to small businessmen who cash checks
emphasize that the person who cashes the check is the ultimate loser if endorsement is
forged. They outline the proper precautions to follow. U.S. SECREr SEmvIcE, KNOW YouR
MONEY 29-31 (1951). One commentator suggests that the lesson of the rule applied in the
case of the forged endorsement is that one should never take a check from a stranger.
This is considered sound business practice. Kessler, Forged Endorsements, 47 YALE LJ.
863, 888 (1938). See also BRIro', BILLS A.Xn NOTES § 143 (1943).
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facts of the particular case. These doctrines may require complicated law-
suits and entail uncertainty in attempting to forecast the outcome of trials.
However, uncertainty and complexity will be mitigated as case law develops
concepts of what constitutes prudent conduct. The flexible doctrines allow
allocating loss to negligent parties in every case and secure freedom for the
law to adjust to changing business conditions and practices through the years,
Alternatively, the complexity and uncertainty of lawsuits can be reduced at
the sacrifice of precise justice if automatic doctrines are chosen which are based
on an approximation of the party who is usually negligent. Since these
doctrines are applied without regard to the particular facts of the case, the
scope of the courts' inquiry can be narrowed, and certainty is promotedp,
This increased predictability promotes out-of-court settlements-an im-
portant advantage in the commercial world. One difficulty experienced with
the automatic standard is that "hard" cases frequently produce exceptions
to the general rule. Then the uncertainty of whether a case will be classified
as within the general rule or the exception is introduced. Or if exceptions
are not created, then loss is placed on parties who are not in fact negligent.
The extent to which this takes place rests on the accuracy of generalizing
as to when negligence occurs and contributes to loss in various types of
situations.
Uniformity. Uniformity in the application of the doctrines which promote
transferability, place the loss on the best risk bearer, and place loss on negli-
gent parties, is essential if these doctrines are to perform their functions.
Doctrines applied differently in similar circumstances, of course, indicate
deviations from achieving desired objectives in at least one of the situations.
But more directly, uniformity provides predictability.05 Consequently, it en-
ables parties to adjust their behavior to establish standards by indicating who
should insure or what conduct is considered careless. And additionally,
uniformity is necessary to produce the equality of treatment of parties in similar
circumstances that fairness requires.
Attainment of uniformity may entail establishing a consistent preference
of one objective over another. Promoting transferability and placing the los!
on the best risk bearer do not produce conflicting resultsP0 But where parties
are negligent, placing the loss on the negligent party may conflict with results
consistent with other objectives. In deciding whether a negligent drawer or
a non-negligent drawee bank is to bear loss, for example, placing loss on the
94. As Justice Brandeis has pointed out, in commercial law "it is more important
that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right." See Burnet v.
Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 2,5 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (dissent). Suggesting the desirability
of automatic standards are Comment, 18 U. OF Cm. L. Rcv. 231, 26 (1951) ; Note, 50
Cor. L REv. S02, 304 (1950).
95. This is particularly true becaue out-of-jurisdiction law may b2 applicable by
conflict of law doctrines. See United States v. Guaranty Trust Co., 293 U.S. 340 (1934);
Swift & Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 230 N.Y. 135, 19 N.E.2d 992 (1939).
96. This is so because both policies can be served by placing the loss en drawee banhs.
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negligent drawer does not result in the best risk bearer's sustaining liability.0 7
Or in deciding whether a negligent taker from the forger or a non-negligent
true owner should carry the loss, selection of the negligent party would con-
flict with the result dictated by desire to promote transferability.
Failure of Law to Realize Objectives
Allocation According to Type of Forgery. Differentiation in ultimate lia-
bility based on the type of forgery frequently frustrates appropriate objectives
for loss allocation. Perhaps the clearest method of illustration is by analysis
of typically recurrent fact situations.
Assume, for example, that a forger enters a store, selects mechandise, pre-
sents bogus identification, and pays with an invalid instrument. The merchant
endorses the check, deposits it at his bank, and the instrument is sent through
the banking system for collection. After payment by the drawee bank, the
forgery is discovered. Following the general mechanical rules: if the drawer's
signature was forged, the drawee will sustain the loss under the forged check
rule ;98 but if the forger falsified an endorsement 99 or altered the payee's name
and endorsed the substituted name,100 loss will fall on the merchant.
Loss allocation geared to the type of forgery does not serve the goal of
placing loss on negligent parties. The rules are frequently defended as placing
loss on parties who are probably negligent in different forgery situations. But
there is no negligence basis for treating the same party differently as the type
of forgery differs.1 1 The merchant, for example, is usually no more negli-
gent in accepting a check with a forged endorsement or artful alteration than
in accepting a forged check. In both cases he identifies the last signature as
being that of the person who presents the check to him, and he can not know
whether the presenter has previously forged either an endorsement or a
97. See discussion in Note, Liability of Drawee Paying on Forged Indorsement, 2o
CoWN. B.J. 215, 218 (1952).
98. See Railway Express Agency v. Bank of Philadelphia, 168 Miss. 279, 150 So. 525
(1933) ; National Bank of Rolla v. First Nat. Bank of Salem, 141 Mo. App. 719, 125
S.W. 513 (1910) ; First Nat. Bank of Cottage Grove v. Bank of Cottage Grove, 59 Ore.
388, 117 Pac. 293 (1911) (more care in limiting to facts). See also cases cited notes 17,
47 supra.
99. The drawee bank can recover from the collecting bank who in turn recovers
from the merchant. See Hartford-Connecticut Trust Co. v. Riverside Trust Co., 123
Conn. 616, 197 Ati. 766 (1938) ; Merchants' Nat. Bank v. Federal State Bank, 206 Mich,
8, 172 N.W. 390 (1919) ; Citizens Bank of Hattiesburg v. Miller, 194 Miss. 557, 11 So.2d
457 (1943); cf. National Bank of Commerce v. First Nat. Bank of Coweta, 51 Okla.
787, 152 Pac. 596 (1915). See cases cited notes 5, 9, 21, 22 supra.
100. As previously pointed out in notes 32, 35 mtpra, there is a split in cases; most
allow the drawee to recover from the collecting bank.
101. Compare, e.g., Kenneth Investment Co. v. National Bank of Republic of St. Louis,
96 Mo. App. 125, 70 S.W. 173 (1902) (drawee not protected), with Leather Manu-
facturers' Bank v. Morgan, 117 U.S. 96 (1885), and Myers v. Southwestern Nat. Bank,
193 Pa. 1, 44 Atl. 280 (1899) (drawee wins).
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drawer's signature.1° - And where the last signature is the forgery, the same
type of documents induce the merchant to believe that the forger is either a
purported drawer or endorser. Similarly, the drawee bank is usually not negli-
gent in failing to discover either a forged endorsement or a forged drawer's
signature. Courts have recognized that a drawee is not negligent if it fails
to examine endorsements for their validity, 0 3 even though it may have a
signature of an endorsee in its possession with which to compare the endorse-
ment."04 This recognition is grounded in the belief that a standard of care
requiring the drawee to examine the numerous signatures on each check is
both unrealistic and unreasonable, and that successful forgery exists despite
the practice of most banks in conducting some examination of the endorse-
ments. 10 5 Since the modem bank processes thousands of checks dailv,' it
is virtually as unrealistic to consider a drawee bank negligent for failure to)
discover a forged drawer's signature.
1
17
102. Compare Cowan v. Thompson, 25 Tenn. App. 130, 152 SA..241 103o (1941
(previous forged signature was of drawCr), -with cases involving previoous forged en-
dorsement signatures: e.g.. National Bank of Detrtoit v. Fidelity & Depo ,it Co. of Md.,
291 Mich. 36, 28 NV. 325 (1939); Prugh, Comlbest & Land v. Linwuod State Bank,
- Mo. -, 241 S.W.2d 3 (1951); United States Guaranty Co. v. Hamilton Nat.
Bank, 189 Tenn. 143. 223 S.W.2d 519 (1949).
103. The law is singularly ambivalent in its requirement that the dravee ascurtain
the genuineness of the endorsements of prior parties. In a suit against a collecting bank
or prior party the drawee is not responsible for knowledge of the genuineness of en-
dorsements. Citizens of Hattiesburg v. Miller, 194 Miss. 557, 11 sv2d 457 (1943);
National Bank of Commerce of N.Y. v. National Mechanics' Banking Ass'n of N.Y.,
55 N.Y. 211 (1873); cases cited note 104 infra. However the drawee owes the payee
the duty to determine the genuineness of the endorsements. Citizens & Southern Nat. Ban!:
v. Davis, 54 Ga. App. 836, 188 S.E. 589 (1936) (certified check) ; Chamberlain Metal Co.
v. Bank of Pleasanton, 98 Kan. 611, 160 Pac. 1138 (1916). And it must amcertain thV
validity of endorsements for the drawer's benefit. Robertson Banking Co. v. Brasfield,
202 Ala. 167, 79 So. 651 (1918); Wormhoudt Lumber Co. v. Union Bank & Trust Co.,
231 Iowa, 928, 2 N.W.2d 267 (1942); Hays v. Lowndes Savings Bank & Trust Co.,
118 Wl. Va. 360, 190 S.E. 543 (1937).
104. See the facts in Board of Education v. National Union Bank of Dover, 121
N.J.L. 177, 1 A.2d 383 (Ct. Err. & App. 1938) (forged endorsements included that of
the maker of check purportedly made out by the maker to maker's ordvr); Cora E.%-
change Bank v. Nassau Bank, 91 N.Y. 74 (1883) (drawee v. collecting bank; no evidence
allowed that practice of drawee is to check endorsements of payee).
105. For bank practice in ex-amining endorsements see Amrmruc. BAmzxims Asso-
cIATioN, BANx Tm.zs Do's AND Do-'Ts 33, 34 (1952); Inviw. TausT Co., SAMU ,rXs
AAiNsT FoaGuanEs 17, 18 (1944). See APPEr.,ix B infra.
106. A drawee may handle as many as 700,000 checks a day. Leary, Delcrrcd Posting
&" Delayed Returms-the Current Check Collcection Problem, 62 H.%av. L Rv.  59 (1949).
The tremendous increase in use of checks in recent years is suggested by the doubling of
debits to accounts in Philadelphia from $16,000,000,000 annually to a2000,O00 arnual-
ly, in the 10-year period 1937-47. Reported in Weiner v. Pennsylvania Co., 160 Pa. Super.
320, 51 A.2d 385 (1947).
107. The original justification for the forged check rule was the drawe's negligence.
Price v. Neal, 3 Burr. 1354,97 Eng. Rep. 871 (K.B. 1702). This requirement that the drawee
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Rules based on the type of forgery operate automatically without regard to
the conduct of parties in particular cases. Thus a merchant who exercises
reasonable care in identifying the party who presents the check to him will
sustain the loss if a forged endorsement is successful,108 while the merchant
who takes no steps to identify the transferee may be protected if the drawer's
signature is forged.' 09 And similarly, the drawee who engaged in the un-
feasible meticulous examination of each check would still bear loss when the
forged drawer's signature is sufficiently clever to defy detection, 110 while the
drawee who failed to attempt to compare a forged endorsement with a sample
signature in its files escapes liability."1 Because of the difficulty in generaliz-
ing as to which party is usually negligent, the automatic rules may serve to
place the loss on a non- negligent party in many-if not a majority--of cases.
But even if a generalization could be made, there seems no basis for different
rules reaching opposite results according to the type of forgery.
Determination of liability according to the type of forgery may defeat other
objectives for loss allocation. The forged instrument rule does promote trans-
examine and discover forgeries of the drawer's signature is firmly embodied in the present
forged check rule. Frankini v. Bank of America Nat. Trust & Savings Ass'n, 31 Cal. App.2d
666, 88 P.2d 790 (1939); National Bank of Rolla v. First Nat. Bank, 1,11 Mo. App. 719,
125 S.W. 513 (1910) ; Bank of Williamson v. McDowell County Bank, 6b W. Va. 545, 66
S.E. 761 (1909). Under modern commercial demands large banks find it virtually im-
possible to authenticate every check. George W. Adlam reports, "The bank has on file
an authentic signature of their depositor, and if in doubt they can check with this file,
and on very large items undoubtedly they do. On the vast flood of small items, particu-
larly payroll checks, it is quite unlikely that the banks take any special precaution. Only
a small part of the checks that they honor are paid directly at the tellers' windows. The
majority of them come through clearings, that is checks paid by other banks or by stores
and deposited at the bank. This of course affords a better opportunity for the bookkeepers
in reconciling the accounts to check the signature file .... [I]n certain of the large city
banks like in New York and Chicago, they rarely check the signatures on items under
$100 or $200." Communication from George W. Adlam to YALE LAW JOURNAL, Mpra
note 86. Banking practice is described in Note, 14 U. OF Cm. L. Rav. 705, 707-8 (1947).
For criticism of forged check presumption of negligence of drawee bank, see Colonial
Trust Co. v. National Bank, 50 Pa. Super. 510 (1912).
103. See National Bank of Detroit v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md., 291 Mich. 36,
288 N.W. 325 (1939).
109. See Germania Bank v. Boutell, 60 Minn. 189, 62 N.W. 327 (1895); Fidelity
& Casualty Co. of N.Y. v. Planenscheck, 200 Wis. 304, 227 N.W. 387 (1929).
110. See Hilton, The Detection of Forgery, 30 J. Cim. L. & CauiNoWGY 568, 571
(1939). "The examiner who states that he can arrive at the true nature of every disputed
signature despite limiting conditions which surround some problems is not a scientist."
Hilton, Science and the Scientific Examination of Signatures, 24 TuLANP L. Rav. 204,
209 (1949). See Inbau, Lay Witness Identification of Handwriting, 34 ILL. L, Rzv. 433,
438-9 (1939). Cases in which careful examination failed to discover the forgery include
Worthen Bank & Trust Co. v. Kelly-Nelson Construction Co., 219 Ark. 882, 245 S.W.2d
405 (1952); Hardy v. Chesapeake Bank, 51 Md. 563 (1879) ; Denbigh v. First Nat. Bank,
102 Wash. 546, 174 Pac. 475 (1918).
111. See cases cited note 104 supra.
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ferability by preserving the finality of payment by the drawee. And it alio
aids in risk distribution by placing loss on banks who may easily sustain and
distribute it. Although the rules for forged endorsements and altered checks
protect the drawer and thus ill not impair his use of checks, they thwart
transferability by increasing the risk of accepting checks as payment and, at
the same time, place the loss on the merchant who is often ill-suited to bear or
distribute it 11 2 Finally, allocation according to type of forgery clearly abne-
gates uniform treatment of parties who act similarly.113
Consider now a second typical fact situation where an employee misappro-
priates company funds by manipulating and forging checks. He may (1) steal
genuine checks from the outgoing mail of the company; (2) supply the names
of fictitious payees to the person drawing the checks, and then steal these
checks; (3)issue forged or unauthorized checks, or (4) write checks to fic-
titious payees and use them as his own. The forger then falsifies an endorse-
ment, perhaps adds his own true name as an endorsement and obtains
cash or merchandise from a bank or local merchant. The, check is
sent through the banking system for collection and the forgery is
subsequently discovered. If the forger has adopted the first alternative, the
forged endorsement rule places loss on the bank or merchant who takes the
check from the forger." 4 In the second case, some jurisdictions place loss
on the employer," 5 while others choose the party who takes from the
112. The forger's intended victim is usually the small merchant. Communication
from U. E. Baughman, Chief, U.S. Secret Service, to YALE LAw JoTTa., Feb. 2s, 1952,
on file in Yale Law Library. Many storekeepers are ansious to make falcs and will take a
check when necessary to make the sale. The highly competitive position and the fair
trade laws make it difficult for merchants to recoup their forgery losses by inicrease.d
prices.
113. For unequal treatment of the merchant-taker, compare forged check Cases cited
note 109 supra in which the taker escapes loss, with Citizens Bank uf Hattiesburg v. iller,
194 Miss. 557, 11 So.2d 457 (1943); J. C. Hackett Co. v. Simmonds, 84 Ohu App. 4t7,
87 N.E.2d 739 (1949), and case cited note 103 supra. Lack uf uniform treatment 6f ti v
drawee bank can be seen by comparing the forged endorsement cases cited nt:te 104 supra,
in which the bank escapes liability, wvith cases cited note 110 supra.
114. Sprague v. West Hudson County Trust Co., 92 N.J. Eq. t39, 114 Ad. 344
(1921); National Surety Co. v. President and Directors of Manhattan Co., 252 N.Y.
247, 169 N.E. 372 (1929); Guardian Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Liberty State Banl:, t)
S.W.2d 823 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933), aftd, 127 Tex. 311, 94 S.W.2d 133 ,193tu);
cases cited notes 20-22 supra. However, the drawer may sustain part of the total loss if
he is negligent in failing to discover the forgeries after losses have cume to his attention.
Detroit Piston Ring Co. %. Wayne County & Home Savings Bank, 252 Mid. 163, 233
N.W. 185 (1930); Scott v. First Nat. Bank in St. Louis, 343 Mo. 77, 119 S.W2d 929
(1933). There has also been a growth in the duty imposed on the drawer to supervise
his employees adequately. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. First Nat. Bank of Denver,
95 Colo. 34, 32 P.2d 268 (1934) ; Defiance Lumber Co. v. Bank of Calif., 1 0 Wash. 533,
41 P.2d 135 (1935). But cf. City of St. Paul v. Merchants' Nat. Bank, 151 Minm. 435,
187 N.W. 516 (1922).
115. See Citizens Loan & Security Co. v. Trust Co. of Georgia, 79 Ga. App. 1&, 53
S.E.2d 179 (1949), 3 VA.,N. L. Rgv. 109 (1949); Suuthall v. Columbia Nat. Bank, 244
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forger.116 In the third situation, where the forger uses forged or unauthorized
checks, loss usually falls on the drawee bank.117 Only in the fourth situation
is the employer certain to sustain the loss.118
Again, allocation according to type of forgery frequently fails to place loss
on negligent parties. If the employer's conduct in misplacing his trust in a
dishonest employee is deemed negligent, then the law fails in not making the
employer liable in all four situations, for the misplaced trust is equally opera-
tive in each.'1 9 This failure is particularly unjustified because there is no
variance in the actions of the drawee bank or parties who take from the forger
which justifies different treatment of them on negligence grounds. But even
if the "misplaced trust" rationale were consistently adhered to, results would
still fail to place loss on negligent parties in so far as employers exercised
assiduous care in placing trust and forgeries nevertheless occurred.120 On
the other hand, if negligence consists of the failure of the employer to dis-
cover continued misappropriation of funds rather than in his misplacing trust,12
the law again inappropriately allocates loss. Under this rationale, the employer
should not be liable for the first instruments in any series of forgeries, for in
none of the four situations can the employer discover the loss caused by the
S.W.2d 577 (Mo. App. 1951); American Surety Co. v. Cortland Savings & Banking Co,,
143 Ohio St. 353, 55 N.E.2d 583 (1944).
116. The cases are most frequently litigated as between drawer and drawee, but
when the drawee loses he can fall back down the chain of endorsements. The drawee
lost in the following cases: American Sash & Door v. Commercial Trust Co., 332 Mo. 98,
56 S.W.2d 1034 (1932); Board of Education v. National Union Bank of Dover, 121
N.J.L. 177, 1 A.2d 383 (Ct. of Err. & App. 1938) ; Shipman v. The Bank of the State of
N.Y., 126 N.Y. 318, 27 N.E. 371 (1891); Commonwealth v. Globe Indemnity Co., 323 Pa.
261, 185 At. 796 (1936) ; Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. First Nat. Bank in Dallas, - Tex. -,
245 S.W.2d 237 (1951). See note 53 supra.
117. See Worthen Bank & Trust Co. v. Kelly-Nelson Const. Co., 219 Ark. 882, 245
S.W.2d 405 (1952); Cairo Banking Co. v. West, 187 Ga. 666, 2 S.E.2d 91 (1939);
Couvillon v. Whitney Nat. Bank of New Orleans, 218 La. 1096, 51 So.2d 798 (1951) ;
Martin v. First Nat. Bank in St. Louis, 358 Mo. 1199, 219 S.W.2d 312 (1949); Newco
Land Co. v. Martin, 358 Mo. 99, 213 S.W.2d 504 (1948); Maryland Casualty Co. v.
Central Trust Co., 297 N.Y. 294, 79 N.E.2d 253 (1948) ; cases cited note 128 infra.
118. See Ellis Weaving Mills v. Citizens & Southern Nat. Bank of Spartanburg, 91
F. Supp. 943 (W.D.S.C.), aff'd, 184 F.2d 43 (4th Cir. 1950). See cases cited 52 supra and
168 infra.
119. Compare cases cited in notes 115 and 118, with cases in which employer escaped
liability despite reliance on forger-employee: Los Angeles Investment Co. v. Home
Savings Bank, 180 Cal. 601, 182 Pac. 293 (1919) ; Jordan Marsh Co. v. National Shaw-
mut Bank, 201 Mass. 397, 87 N.E. 740 (1909) ; Fitzgibbons Boiler Co. v. National City
Bank, 287 N.Y. 326, 39 N.E2d 897 (1942). See cases cited note 116 supra.
120. See Defiance Lumber Co. v. Bank of Cal., 180 Wash. 533, 41 P.2d 135 (1935),
especially dissenting opinion. The rule is criticized in Comment, Depositors' Duty to
Examine Bank Statements for Forged or Altered Checks, 6 ARK. L. Rxv. 199, 204 (1952).
121. See First Nat. Bank of Birmingham v. Allen, 100 Ala. 476, 14 So. 335 (1893);
Osborn v. Corn Exchange Nat. Bank, 218 Ill. App. 28 (1920); Israel v. State Nat. Bank
of New Orleans, 124 La. 885, 50 So. 783 (1909).
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first forgeries until after the loss has occurred.122 As to additional losses,
there is some justification in negligent conduct for holding the employer liable,
since he may be considered to have a duty to discover existence of forged
checks by comparing his returned checks with his books.23 But then he
should be liable in all four situations.1- 4 However, even in situations where
there is some justification for allocating loss to the employer, mechanical doc-
trine may not in fact place loss on negligent parties for it does not relate to
the actual conduct of the employer in each case. Where the dishonest employee
keeps the company books, for example, the employer may not discover the
forgery even by exercising considerable care: nevertheless he will le held
liable.'2 5
Allocation according to the type of forgery, as applied to misappropriations
of company funds, may also fail to serve other objectives. Differences in treat-
ment of parties who behave similarly in analogous situations defeat attain-
ment of uniformity.-' 6 In addition, it is symptomatic of inconsistent fulfill-
ment of other objectives. Transferability is promoted by current doctrine
which allocates loss to the employer in the fictitious payee situations, '2
and to the drawee in the forged check cases .12S But where genuine checks
are stolen,2 9 or in some fictitious payee cases,12 placing loss on the
122. Compare Scott v. First Nat. Bank in St. Louis, 343 Mo. 77, 119 S.V2d 929
(1938); Detroit Piston Ring Co. v. Wayne County & Home Savings Bank, 252 Mich.
163, 233 N.W. 185 (1930) (cases in which drawer loses only amount after time he
should have discovered fraudulent scheme), Tvith fictitious payee cases in which drawer
loses all, even the first checks, cited notes 115, 118 supra. And see the application of
the fictitious payee rule to make the drawer lose on the first check but win on subsequent
checks. Callan-ay v. Hamilton Nat. Bank of Washington, 195 F2d 556 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
123. See notes 41-43a supra.
124. See forged endorsement cases w.here drawer could have discovered forgery by
examining checks, but did not, and Nwas still permitted to recover. First Nat. Banl: of
Atlanta v. American Surety Co., 71 Ga. App. 112, 30 S.E.2d 402 (1944) ; Board of Edu-
cation v. National Union Bank of Dover, 121 N.J.L. 177, 1 A.2d 383 (Ct. of Err. & App.
1938); Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. First Nat. Bank in Dallas, - Tex. -, 245 S.2d
237 (1951). Contra: Royal Indemnity Co. v. Federal Reserve Bank, 33 F. Supp. b21
(S.D. Ohio 1939), aft'd, 119 F.2d 778 (6th Cir. 1941).
125. Whitney Trust & Savings Bank v. Jurgens-Fuwler Cu., 129 La. 455, 1-;u So. 4d0
(1934); Myers v. Southwestern Nat Bank, 193 Pa. 1. 44 Ati. 20 1899) ; First Nat.
Bank of Richmond v. Richmond Electric Co., 10, Va. 347, S6 S.E. 152 (1997). Brit cf.
Clark v. National Shoe & Leather Bank of N.Y., 164 N.Y. 493, 58 N.E. 09 (100)
(depositor only charged with knowledge that a dishonest agent obtained by examination).
126. Compare cases cited notes 114-118 supra.
127. See cases cited notes 115, 118 sufira.
128. See Greensboro Ice & Fuel Co. v. Security Nat. Bank, 210 N.C. 244, 10 S.E.
362 (1936); R. 14. Kimball Inc. v. Rhode Island Hospital Nat. Bank, 72 IL. 144, 43
A.2d 420 (1947); Denbigh v. First Nat. Bank, 102 Wash. 546, 174 Pac. 475 (1918);
and cases cited note 117 stpra.
129. See cases cited note 114 supra.
130. See cases cited note 116 supra.
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merchant or bank who take from the forger directly thwarts transferability
On the other hand, placing loss on the drawee bank promotes sensible risk
distribution.13 l And even placing loss on the employer partially aids pursuit
of the same goal because of a company's ability to bond its employees.1 2 But
again liability for the taker from the forger frustrates this objective.18 3 In
131. See cases cited note 117 supra, and discussion in notes 87-90 supra.
132. For suggestions of this policy see Comment, Fictitious Payee and the U.C.C.,
18 U. OF CHI. L. R v. 281 (1951); Note, Liability of Bank for Frauds of Depositor's
Employee, 14 U. OF CHI. L. Ray. 705 (1947). The fallacy in this approach is the added
cost of multiple policies and duplicating insurance against the same risk since the depositor's
forgery bond also indemnifies the bank. See note 89 supra. If the drawee bank insured
against the loss and passed on the cost of the protection in proportion to the number
of checks issued, the large user of checks pays commensurately for his protection. The
Depositors' Forgery Bond insures against forgery or alteration of any check made by
or drawn upon the insured or made by one acting or purporting to act as agent of the
insured, -regardless of whether the endorsement is a forgery within the law of the place
controlling the construction thereof. The bond's coverage includes any check drawn in
the name of the insured, payable to a fictitious payee and endorsed in the name of such
fictitious payee; any check procured in a face-to-face transaction with the insured by
anyone impersonating another and drawn payable to the one impersonated; and any
payroll check drawn by the insured payable to bearer as well as to a named payee and en-
dorsed by anyone other than the named payee without authority from the payee. Mechanically
reproduced facsimile signatures are treated the same as handwritten signatures. The
underwriter further indemnifies any bank in which the insured carries a checking or
savings account against losses sustained through any of the described types of forgery
or alteration. AMERICAN SuRary COMPANY OF NEW YoRic, DEPOSITORS FORGERY BOND
(rev. to Feb. 1, 1948).
Rates charged for bonds are:
Amount of Bond 1 year 3 years






* Premiums subject to discount for good experience.
AMERICAN SuRETy COMPANY, DEPOSITORS FORGERY BoN D--CovER1AG AND RATES (rev.
April 1, 1948).
One possible way of handling embezzlement schemes when the depositor is insured is to
hold that collection from the insurance company is an election of remedies and the insurance
company then has no action against the drawee. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v.
First Nat. Bank in Dallas, 172 F.2d 258 (5th Cir. 1949) ; United States Fidelity & Guaranty
Co. v. Fidelity Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 232 Mo, App. 412, 109 S.W.2d 47 (1937). However
the majority view is contra. Tarrant American Savings Bank v. Smokeless Fuel Co., 233
Ala. 507, 172 So. 603 (1937); First Nat. Bank of Atlanta v. American Surety Co., 71
Ga. App. 112, 30 S.E.2d 402 (1944); Grubnau v. Centennial Nat. Bank, 279 Pa. 501,
124 Ati. 142 (1924) ; Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. First Nat. Bank, - Tex, -, 245 SW.2d
237 (1951).
133. See note 112 supra.
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short, allocation according to type of forgery leaves attainment of desired
goals at the mercy of the forger's conduct.
Allocation Modified by Negligence Doctrines. In recent years courts have
placed increasing emphasis upon holding liable parties whose negligence con-
tributed to forgery losses. As a result, negligence doctrines have been intro-
duced to modify allocation according to the type of forgery. 13  While in many
situations these doctrines serve more effectively than rules based on type of
forgery to place loss on negligent parties,13 5 they are nevertheless defective
in several respects.
Some negligence doctrines imposing loss on the drawer have hardened into
absolute rules of liability presenting a twofold inadequacy in allocating loss
to negligent parties. This is true, for example, of the "impostor"2 0 and fic-
titious payee rules,137 and of statutes limiting the drawer's right to recovery
if he fails to notify the bank of a forgery within the statutory time period.,l
Since loss is imposed on the drawer without regard to his conduct in any
particular case, he will be liable even though he has exercised reasonable
care.139 And even where other parties are negligent and the drawer is not, he
may nevertheless sustain loss.
140
Existing negligence doctrines are also inadequate in allocating loss to negli-
gent parties because courts refuse to invoke them in many situations. The
drawee bank that pays a forged check, for example, is liable under the forged
check rule.14 1 When a collecting bank has been negligent in handling the
134. This can be seen in the depositor's duty to his bank in the case of forged
instruments. Compare Weisser's Administrators v. Denison, 10 N.Y. 63 (1854) (de-
positor owes no duty to bank), i4th Critten v. Chemical Nat. Bank, 171 N.Y. 219, 63
N.E. 969 (1902) (duty to exercise reasonable care to verify vouchers by record of
checks issued). In regard to development of drawer's duty to report forged endorEements
see BRiTTOx, BIU.S AND NoTEs 672 (1943).
135. See, e.g., cases cited notes 45, 57, 5, 64, 65 supra.
136. See notes 48-50 supra.
137. See notes 51-4 supra.
138. See notes 39, 40 supra.
139. E.g.. Santa Maria v. Industrial City Bank & Banking Co., 32,j Mass. 440, 95
N.E.2d 176 (1951) (impostor rule puts loss on prudent merchant) ; Equitable Life Ins.
Soc. v. National Bank of Commerce, 181 S.W. 1176 (Mo. App. 1910t) (fictitious payee
rule imputes knowledge of dishonest employee to employer) ; Stump v. Bank of N.Y., 212
App. Div. 603, 209 N.Y. Supp. 396 (1st Dep't 1925) (depositor v.ho e.xamincd checks
and compared them with stubs and balance, liable). See cases cited note 125 supra and
140 nfra.
140. E.g.. Childs v. Empire Trust Co. 54 F.2d 931 (2d Cir. ), cert. den.. 2e'9 U.S. 554
(1932) (fictitious payee rule places loss on innocent creditors when bank takes checks
from trustee under questionable circumstances).
141. Deposit Bank of Georgetown v. Fayette Nat. Bank, 90 Ky. 10 (1S90); Com-
mercial & Farmers Nat. Bank v. First Nat. Bank of Baltimore, 30 MdI. 11 (1E59);
Bank of St. Albans v. Farmers & Mechanics Bank, 10 Vt. 141 (183) ; and see cases cited
notes 17, 98 supra.
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check, some courts permit the drawee to shift its loss to the negligent party.142
But in many jurisdictions the collecting bank's negligence does not affect the
drawee's liability.143 In different fact situations many states also disregard
the negligent conduct of the drawer in adjusting loss.' 44 Finally, a negligent
party may escape liability because litigants are not permitted to raise the issue
of the negligence of one who is not before the court, 145 while at the same time
the losing litigant may have no cause of action against the negligent party.140
Current use of negligence doctrines also fails to secure uniformity and so
provides neither a guide for conduct nor equal treatment of parties who act
similarly. Courts disagree in determining when negligence doctrines apply
and in their effects on loss allocation. 47 For example, a drawer's failure to
discover and report a forgery may not make him liable at all, 148 or it may
make him liable only for the loss due to his failure,14 9 or it may create lia-
bility for the total loss.'5 0 At the same time, there is variance in the concept
142. Security Commercial & Savings Bank of San Diego v. Southern Trust & Com-
merce Bank, 74 Cal. App. 734, 241 Pac. 945 (1925) ; National Park Batik v. Ninth Nat,
Bank, 46 N.Y. 77 (1871) ; Johnson v. Commercial Bank, 27 W. Va. 343 (1885) ; cf, State
Bank of Chicago v. First Nat. Bank of Omaha, 87 Neb. 351, 127 N.W. 244 (1910); and
see cases cited notes 45, 46 supra.
143. Howard v. Mississippi Bank, 28 La. Ann. 727 (1876); Commercial & Farmers'
Bank of Baltimore v. First Nat. Bank of Baltimore, 30 Md. 11 (1868) ; Railway Express
Agency v. Bank of Philadelphia, 168 Miss. 279, 150 So. 525 (1933); State Bank v.
Cumberland Savings & Trust Co., 168 N.C. 605, 85 S.E. 5 (1915) ; Cherokee Nat. Bank
v. Union Trust Co., 33 Okla. 342, 125 Pac. 464 (1912) ; Bank of St. Albans v. Farmers'
Bank, 10 Vt. 141 (1838); Bank of Williamson v. McDowell County Bank, 66 W. Va.
545, 66 S.E. 761 (1909).
144. The rationale is that the negligence is not proximate. See Jordan Marsh Co.
v. National Shawmut Bank, 201 Mass. 397, 87 N.E. 740 (1909); and cases cited note
59 supra.
145. See cases cited notes 47, 67 stipra.
146. See note 68 .rupra.
147. In addition to the examples cited in the text see varying application of the
impostor rule at note 48 supra, the fictitious payee rule at note 53 supra, and see also
note 38 supra.
148. R. H. Kimball Inc. v. Rhode I$land Hospital Nat. Bank, 72 R.I. 144, 48 A2d
420 (1946). See also National Bank of Commerce v. Tacoma Mill Co., 182 Fed. 1 (9th
Cir. 1910).
149. See First Nat. Bank of Birmingham v. Allen, 100 Ala. 476, 14 So. 335 (1893);
Bank of Black Rock v. B. Johnson & Son Tie Co., 148 Ark. 11, 229 S.W. 1 (1921);
Janin v. London & San Francisco Bank, 92 Cal. 14, 27 Pac. 1100 (1891); Israel v. State
Nat. Bank of New Orleans, 124 La. 885, 50 So. 783 (1909); Deer Island Fish & Oyster
Co. v. First Nat. Bank of Biloxi, 166 Miss. 162, 146 So. 116 (1933) ; Critten v. Chemical
Nat. Bank, 171 N.Y. 219, 63 N.E. 969 (1902) ; Johnson v. Nat. Bank of Beaver Falls, 367
Pa. 459, 81 A.2d 95 (1951); Atlas Metal Works v. Republic Nat. Bank, 176 S.W.2d 350
(Tex. Civ. App. 1944).
150. Union Trust Co. v. Soble, 192 Md. 427, 64 A.2d 744 (1948); Morgan v. United
States Mortgage & Trust Co., 208 N.Y. 218, 101 N.E. 871 (1913); Murry v. Real Estate
Ins. Co., 39 Pa. Super. 438 (1909).
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of the required causal relation between negligence and the forgery loss.15t
One of many examples is the case of negligent mailing by the drawer. He
may or may not sustain loss because courts differ in deciding whether the
intervening criminal act of the forger breaks the causal relationship.Yr2 Stand-
ards of care, such as required measures to identify transferees, also differ widely
from state to state.153 And in the case of standards for discovering forgeries, de-
cisions vary even within a singl, jurisdiction.'5 Because of the widespread
movement of negotiable instruments, conflicting opinions are particularly un-
settling, for the extraterritorial effect of alternate views further hampers
uniformity within the confines of a jurisdiction. 1'5
The introduction of negligence doctrines frequently thwarts attainment of
other objectives in loss allocation. Transferability is hampered where los., is
placed on a collecting bank negligent in handling forged checks, 150 or where
takers from forgers are held liable for failure to exercise sufficient care in
identifying the forger.'7 7 Moreover, most modifications based on negligence
151. E.g.. causal relationship of: (1) negligent superviqon of cmplo-yces, compare
notes 58 and 59 supra, and see note 63 supra; (2) negligent dra%%ing of check leading t-a
an alteration making drawer liable, Glasswell Developnwnt Co. v. Citizens' Nat. Uank,
191 Cal. 375. 216 Pac. 1012 (1923) ; Gutfrcund v. East River Nat. Banl:. 251 X.Y. 5M,
167 N.E. 171 (1929); not making drawer liable, Citizens Bank of M rchead v. Niclkell,
277 Ky. 424, 126 S.W.2d 820 (1939): First Nat. Bank v. Kelchum, (-,S Ola. 104, 172 Pac.
81 (1918); Glasscock v. First Nat. Batk, 114 Tex. 207, 2 w S.A. 820 (1924); (3)
negligent leaving of blank signed checks accessible which were cashed with forged en-
dorsement bars recovery by drawer, Weiner v. Pennsylvania Co., 16) Pa. Super. 320,
51 A.2d 385 (1947). Contra: Martin v. First Nat. Bank in St. Iouis. 385 Mo. 114a9, 210
S.,V2d 312 (1949). See notes .A 65 supra.
152. See note 57 s'upra.
153. See note 46 strpra. As to differencets in standards % here a .uperviqing tmplo, '.
issues forged checks, compare Myers v. Southwestern Nat. Bank, 193 Pa. 1, 44 At. 2 A
(1899) (employer loses), with Kenneth Investment Co. v. National flank of Republic, % Mo.
App. 125, 70 S.W. 173 (1902) (employer wins); Denbigh v. First Nat. lPank, 102 Wash.
546, 174 Pac. 475 (1918) (employer wins), with Green4wrco Ice & Fuel C.,. v. Skolrft
Nat. Bank, 210 N.C. 244, 186 S.E. 362 (1936) (employer rcoverb part of loss).
154. On length of time in which depositor must give notice to bank, compare Johnmon
v. First Nat. Bank of Beaver Falls, 367 Pa. 459, 81 A2d 95 (1951) (rccovery wvhere no
authoritative notice until three months after forgery), with Lesley v. Eving, 243 Pa. 135,
93 AtL 875 (1915) (estopped after two months) ; Conorns v. Old Forge Discount & De-
posit Bank, 245 Pa. 97, 91 Atl. 210 (1914) (estopped after six we:s); Knights of
Joseph Building & Loan Ass'n v. Guaranty Trust & Safe Deposit Co., 69 Pa. Super. 89
(1918) (estopped after five weeks). On the duty of the depositor to examine returned
checks, compare Takenaka v. Bankers' Trust Co., 132 Mist. 3. , 229 N.Y. Supp. 459
(Sup. Ct. 1928) (examination of returned vouchers with check bouok sufficient even though
forgery scheme not discovered), with Stumpp v. Bank of N.Y., 212 App. Div. k03, 269
N.Y. Supp. 396 (1st Dept. 1925) (comparison of checks with stubs not sufficient).
155. See, c.g., Swift & Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 2S0 N.Y. 135, 19 N.E 992 (1939)
(Illinois amendment of the NIL applied in New York court).
156. See notes 45, 142 supra.
157. See, e.g., Citizens' Bank of Fayette v. J. Blach & Suns, 221 Ala. 24*, 153 So.
404 (1934) ; J. C. Hackett Co. v. Simmonds, 84 Ohio App. 467, S7 N.E2d 739 (1949) ;
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shift loss to parties other than the drawee bank 158 and therefore frustrate the
objective of placing the burden on the best risk bearer. 150 Consequently, these
decisions can only be justified if placing loss on negligent parties is deemed
paramount to promotion of transferability and selection of the best risk bearer.
However, courts apparently have not considered establishing a consistent
priority of objectives. As a result there is an inexplicit or even unconscious
choice of one goal at the sacrifice of another, and, additionally a concomitant
lack of uniformity.
Allocation Modified by Availability of Defenses. Modifications introduced
in loss allocation because of the peculiar availability of defenses defeats all
sensible objectives. Gearing loss allocation to negligence is blatantly thwarted
when one party, by waiving a defense, can immunize a negligent person from
attack of others who must then bear the loss.1'0 And a like frustration of the
negligence objective occurs by the law's refusal to consider the negligence
issue an appropriate plea for particular parties, even when the negligent person
is before the court.161 Moreover, since the results of the availability of de-
fenses are largely unintended, their use may frustrate other objectives as well,
Transferability may be aided when loss is precluded from falling on one who
takes from a forger or on the collecting bank,6 2 but just as frequently the
opposite result occurs.' 63 Moreover, since the defenses usually operate to shift
loss away from the drawee bank, 64 attaining the goal of risk distribution rests
Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Pittsburg Pipe & Supply Co., 135 S.W.2d 818 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1940).
158. See note 15 supra. But most states do not permit the drawee to take advantage
of the negligence of other parties if it was negligent itself. See American Hominy Co. v.
Millikin Nat. Bank, 273 Fed. 550 (S.D. Ill. 1920) ; Union Tool Co. v. Farmers' & Merchants'
Nat. Bank, 192 Cal. 40, 218 Pac. 424 (1923); Herbel v. People's State Bank of Ellinwood,
170 Kan. 620, 228 P.2d 929 (1951) ; Kasnowitz v. Manufacturers' Trust Co., 171 Misc. 545,
13 N.Y.S.2d 211 (Sup. Ct. 1939) ; R. H. Kimball, Inc. v. Rhode Island Hospital Nat. Bank
72 R.I. 144, 48 A.2d 420 (1946); McCormick v. Rapid City Nat. Bank, 67 S.D. 586, 297
N.W. 39 (1941) ; Wussow v. Badger State Bank of Milwaukee, 204 Wis. 467, 234 N.W.
720 (1931). See note 44 supra.
159. See notes 87-90 supra.
160. E.g., when the drawee bank waives its defense against a drawer who negligently
delayed in notifying the bank of an invalid check, a non-negligent collecting bank must
repay the drawee and in turn fall back on the taker from the forger. The taker bears the
loss without regard to his negligence. See cases cited note 67 supra. Also the taker bears
ultimate liability if the collecting bank should refund payment on a forged check to a
negligent drawee bank. See note 70 supra.
161. E.g., where a negligent taker is involved in transactions which produce a suit
between collecting and drawee banks on a forged check, the inability of the drawee to
assert the negligence of the taker will bar his iecovery against the collecting bank, although
if the collecting bank lost it could have in turn recovered from the negligent taker. See
First National Bank of Portland v. United States Nat. Bank of Portland, 100 Ore. 264,
197 Pac. 547 (1921), and notes 47, 70 supra.
162. See discussion note 161 supra.
163. See discussion note 160 supra.
164. See note 15 supra.
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entirely on the peculiar variance in their availability. At the same time uni-
formity of treatment of different parties who act similarly, or the same party
who acts analogously in different cases, is clearly stymied.165 In short, the
self interest of parties in waiving defenses or choosing defendants determines
the attainment of desired objectives.
EXISTING PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE
Dissatisfaction with current law has prompted suggestions for change1ca
The Fictitious Payee Act and the Payment of Forged or Raised Check Act,
already enacted in many states, offer changes directed at specific areas in
existing law. On the other hand, the Uniform Commercial Code embodies
changes in the methods of allocating forgery losses as part of an overall re-
codification of the current Negotiable Instruments Law.
Proposed Amendments to the Negotiable Instruments Law
Fictitious Payee Act. This Act, in some fictitious payee situations, makes
the drawer liable where current law usually places loss on the party taking
from the forger.16 7 Prior to the Act, an employer-drawer was liable when his
dishonest employee drew extra checks to fictitious payees and appropriated
them to his own use ;1Os but when the dishonest employee was one who pre-
165. Compare,. e.g., the position of the drawer in Manufacturers' Bank of Cohoes v.
Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 102 Misc. 339, 168 N.Y. Supp. 913 (Sup. Ct. 1918)
(drawer who did not give timely notice of forgery is protected), uith Shattuck v. Guardian
Trust Co. of New York, 204 N.Y. 200, 97 N.E. 517 (1912).
166. Despite the fact that the shortcomings of the present law reduund to the detriment
of the entire business community, proposed changes have come primarily from banking
organizations. The American Bankers Association, for example, has an active committee
on state legislation. This is understandable because of the great interest the banks have
in the problem of forgery losses. While individual business concerns or private parties
will seldom, if ever, be confronted with a forgery loss, banks must be continually akrted
against the possibility. The absence of demand for change from other segments of the com-
mercial world, then, is probably due to the insignificance of the problem to any one
member rather than to satisfaction with the status quo.
167. The Fictitious Payee Act amends NIL § 9(3) to provide that an instrument
is made payable to bearer "when it is payable to the order of a fictitious or ntoexistent
or living person nwt intendcd to have any interest in it, and such fact was known to the
person making it so payable, or known to his emplosee or other agent who supplies the
name of such payee." (Emphasis supplied to indicate amendnnmt.) The Act has been
adopted in Alabama, Arizona, California, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Louisiana, Massachuetts,
Missouri, Montana, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oregon, West Virgina, Wisconsin and
Wyoming. For interpretation, see Citizens Loan & Security Co. v. Trust Co. of Georgia,
79 Ga. App. 184, 53 S.E2d 179 (1949) ; Houghton-Mifilin Co. v. Continental Illinois Nat.
Bank & Trust Co., 293 Ill. App. 423 (193) ; Swift & Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 2Z0 N.Y.
135, 19 N.E. 2d 992 (1939).
16S. Childs v. Empire Trust Co., 54 F.2d 981 (2d Cir.), cert. den., 21b U.S. 554 (1932);
Bartlett v. First Nat. Bank of Chicago, 247 Ill. 490, 93 N.E. 337 (1910) ; Bourne v. Mary-
land Casualty Co., 185 S.C. 1, 192 S.E. 605 (1937). See cases cited note 52 mipra.
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pared accounts and "padded" them with fictitious payees while an honest
employee drew the checks on the basis of the accounts, the taker from the
forger ultimately sustained loss.16 The Fictitious Payee Act places loss on
the employer-drawer in this latter situation as well.170
The proposed reform achieves more desirable results than existing law, but
is nevertheless imperfect. Justification for the Act may be found in promotion
of transferability through decreasing the possibility that the taker from the
forger will assume risks in taking checks. Furthermore, as between the taker
and the drawer, the latter is in a better position to insure against loss by bond-
ing his employees and absorbing or passing on the insurance as part of his
total business expense.171 But placing loss on the drawee rather than the
drawer would have promoted transferability just as well, and, at the same time,
vould have obtained even better risk distribution. 172 No justification for the
Act, however, can be found in the objective of allocating loss to negligent
parties. Employers who are the victims of embezzlement schemes are not
necessarily negligent in failing to detect or prevent the crime: and loss may
just as readily be facilitated by a negligent taker from the forger.17a Thus a
fixed standard of liability predicated on probabilities of negligence is inappro-
priate here because of the inaccuracy of generalization as to where negligence
contributing to loss most frequently occurs. And since the Act precludes the
operation of exceptions which will allocate loss to parties proven negligent in
particular cases, it will in fact defeat the goal of gearing loss to negligence.
Universal adoption of the Act naturally promotes uniformity of doctrine,
And the Act further promotes uniformity of treatment for parties who act
similarly inasmuch as it abolishes a distinction in loss allocation grounded upon
the particular employee who was dishonest.l1 However, in the context of
forgery cases generally, the Act suffers from its narrow scope and consequently
cannot bring about complete equality of treatment for parties behaving similar-
ly. For example, employers, in cases of fictitious payee checks sustain loss
under the Act while employers victimized by forged checks are protected.176
Ideally, the fictitious payee situation should be treated at least as part of the
entire problem of misappropriation of company funds through activities of dis-
honest employees.
The Payment of Forged or Raised Check Act. The Forged or Raised Check
Act makes drawers liable for failure to discover and report to the drawee bank
169. See cases cited notes 53, 116 supra.
170. Southall v. Columbia Nat. Bank, 244 S.W2d 577 (Mo. App. 1951). See cases
cited notes 53, 115, 167 supra.
171. See discussion note 132 supra.
172. See notes 87-90 supra.
173. See the court's attitude in J. C. Hackett Co. v. Simmonds, 84 Ohio App. 467, 87
N.E.2d 739 (1949) (denying application of impostor rule which would place loss on drawer,
and placing loss on taker from the forger).
174. Compare the cases cited in notes 53, 116 supra in which drawer wins, Tvith cases
cited in notes 52, 115 supra in which drawer loses.
175. See cases cited in notes 117, 128 supra.
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within a required period of time, raised (i.e., where the amount is altered)
or forged checks.' 7 6 Thus a drawee bank which has debited the drawer's
account for a forged check may now be protected.17  And the taker from
the forger who received money on a raised check no longer sustains loss for
the amount of the alteration.1
8
This Act is hardly an improvement over existing law. In its application to
the raised check, the Act does improve transferability and risk distribution
by shifting loss from the taker to the drawer °9 In the more frequent forged
check cases, however, transferability is already well secured by existing la\v
which places loss on the drawee bank who pays on the check. 2 3 Here the Act
actually thwarts the most efficient risk distribution by substituting the drawer
as risk bearer.' 8 ' Supporters of the new legislation justify placing loss on the
drawer for his negligence in not discovering and reporting the fraudulent
check. But the Act will not serve the goal of allocating loss on a negligence
basis in fairly frequent situations. Under the Act the drawer will be held
liable, for example, where he has, without negligence, entrusted a dishonest
employee with the verification of checks, and the employee fails to report the
invalid check in order to cover his earlier act of creating it.' 82 And in situations
such as this, loss will rest on the non-negligent drawer irrespective of the
negligence of other parties associated with the instrument.Y8
176. The Act (with differing time limits) has bckn pasied in 37 states. The e.'ception:,
are Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Indiana. Kentucky, Maryland, Mississippi, New
Hampshire, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Vermunt.
177. See cases cited note 40 supra.
178. The taker would not bear the loss in those jurisdictions which did not permit the
drawer to sue the taker directly. See California Mill Supply Co. v. Bank of America, 3t)
Cal.2d 334, 223 P.2d 849 (1950); First Nat. Bank of Bloomiiigdale v. North Jersey Trust
Co., 18 N.J. Misc. 449, 14 A.2d 765 (Sup Ct. 1940) ; Lavanier v. Cosmopolitan Bank & Trust
Co., 36 Ohio App. 285, 173 N.E. 216 (1929). Contra: Washington Mechanics Savings Ban!:
v. District Title Ins. Co., 65 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1933); Gustin-Bacon Mfg. Co. v. First
Nat. Bank of Englewood, 306 Ill. 179, 137 N.E. 793 (192) ; Life Ins. Co. of Virginia v.
Edisto Nat. Bank of Orangeburg, 166 S.C. .505, 165 S.E. 178 (1932). See discussion in
Corker, Risk of Loss from Forged Indorsemeazt. 4 ST.%.. L. RuEv. 24 (1951). Even where te
drawer can sue the taker, however, the taker may bt protected if it c-in raise as a defense
the delay of the drawer in discovering the forgery .,r alteration. See cases cited under
"but cf." signal in note 67 supra, and cases prohibiting recovery in nutw 71 supro.
179. In some jurisdictions the taker did not sustain the loss under prior law because
the drawee could not recover money paid out on an altered instrument. See note 32 supre.
In these jurisdictions transferability and risk distribution were better served by placing
the loss on the drawee bank, and the Act's shifting of the loss to the drawer is undesirable.
180. See discussion and cases cited notes 16, 17 supra.
181. See discussion note 132 sittra.
182. Cases in which statute cuts off all or part of recovery include Greensboro Ice
& Fuel Co. v. Security Nat. Bank, 210 N.C. 244, 186 S.E. 362 (1936) (even if no negligence
in employing embezzler who forges checks) and those cited note 40 supra.
18 3. The statute might reverse the result of a case such as Denbigh v. First Nat.
Bank, 102 Wash. 546, 174 Pac. 475 (1918) (drawer not negligent in not discovering
forgery made by employee who had been hired only on good recommendations).
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The Uniform Commercial Code'84
The Uniform Commercial Code promulgated in part as a successor to the
Negotiable Instruments Law proposes changes in the allocation of losses re-
sulting from forgeries. 8 5 Initially, the Code evidences an intent to retain a
structure of allocation according to types of forgery, although changes are
introduced that modify some existing rules relating to types of forgery. How-
ever, the Code contains a host of new negligence concepts which substantial-
ly vary the potential loss bearer. Additionally, the Code modifies its basic
allocation structure by continuing and adding to the peculiar availability of
defenses. These changes, coupled with possibilities for widely varying inter-
pretations due to drafting ambiguities in the Code,180 radically alter both
current law and a structure of allocating related to type of forgery.
Allocation According to Type of Forgery. The Code, in its comments, ex-
plicitly states an intent to retain the forged check rule which places loss on a
drawee who has paid or accepted a forged check 187 when the payment is to
a party who has followed reasonable business conduct in obtaining the check 188
184. For complete CRoss REFERExcE TABLE TO DISCUSSIOx OF CODE SECTIONS see
APENimcx C, page 477 infra.
185. The Uniform Commercial Code represents an attempt to "simplify and modernize
and develop greater precision and certainty in the rules of law governing commercial
transactions [and] to preserve flexibility ... and ... continued expansion of commercial
practices and mechanisms through custom, usage and agreement of the parties." U.C.C.
§ 1-102(2).
186. The Code contains a plea for liberal construction "to promote its underlying
purpose and policies." U.C.C. § 1-102(1). However the policies themselves are general
enough to allow great latitude of opinion. See note 185 supra. Detailed rules for interpreta-
tion include: "(a) Definitions and formal requirements . . . are not subject to variation
by agreement; (b) Except as otherwise provided by this Act the rights and duties of
a third party may not be adversely varied by an agreement to which lie is not a party or
by which he is not otherwise bound; (c) The general obligations prescribed by this Act
such as good faith ... and reasonable care may not be disclaimed by agreement but the
parties may by agreement determine the standards by which the performance of such obli-
gations is to be measured if such standards are not manifestly unreasonable; ... (f) The
Comments of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the
American Law Institute may be consulted in the construction and application of this Act
but if text and comment conflict, text controls; (g) Prior drafts of text and comments
may not be used to ascertain legislative intent." U.C.C. § 1-102(3). See Franklin, Ott the
Legal Methods of the U.C.C., 16 LAW & CoNTEmP. PROB. 330, 333-5 (1951).
187. "Except for recovery of bank payments as provided in the Article on Bank
Deposits and Collections [Article 4] and except for liability for breach of warranty on
presentment under the preceding section, payment or acceptance of any instrument is
final in favor of a holder in due course." U.C.C. § 3-418. The actions on breach of
warranty include recovery on an altered check or check with forged endorsentent,
U.C.C. § 3-417. The Comments specify, "This section follows the rule of Price v. Neal ...
under which a drawee who accepts or pays an instrument on which the signature of the
drawer is forged is bound on his acceptance and cannot recover back his payment."
188. The protection only extends to a holder in due course. Ibid. To be a holder in
due course under the U.C.C. a party must not only take the instrument for value, in good
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or who has taken a check previously obtained by some party who was busi-
nesslike' s 9 However, the forged check rule is subordinated to other sections
in the Code which may operate to abridge or abolish the rule.'0 0  In the
situations where subordination may produce a result that eliminates the
drawee's liability, it will do so by permitting the drawee to recover either
from the drawer or from prior parties who handled the check. Where
recovery is against prior parties, these will in turn fall back against those who
negotiated the check, and consequently the taker from the forger will ultimately
sustain loss. Where recovery is against the drawer, he wil sustain ultimate
loss only in those jurisdictions where he cannot sue other parties and thus shift
the ultimate loss to the taker from the forger.
The extent to which subordination will operate to shift loss from the drawee
to the taker rests largely on the way in which courts will construe the Code.
However, at least one change seems dear. Common law generally treated a
check which contained both a forged drawer's signature and forged endorse-
ment as a forged check and consequently held the drawee liable.' 0 ' By sub-
ordinating the forged check rule to the sections on forged endorsements, the
Code suggests that such a double forgery will be treated as a forged endorse-
ment.19 2 Consequently, the drawee will be permitted to recover against prior
parties and loss will shift to the taker from the forger.10 3 In another set of
situations, one commentator suggests that subordination of the forged check
rule to the warranties sections of the Code may permit the drawee to recover
against prior parties on a warranty of "good title to the instrument,"''1  al-
faith, and without notice that it is overdue, or has been dishonored, or is subject to defenses,
but further must have observed "the reasonable commercial standards of any businecs
in which the holder may be engaged." U.C.C. § 3-302(1).
189. "Transfer of an instrument vests in the transferee such rights as the transferor
has therein, except that a transferee who has himself been a party to any fraud or illegality
affecting the instrument or who as a prior holder had notice of a defense or claim against
it cannot improve his position by taking from a later holder in due course." U.C.C.
§ 3-201 (1). Thus a future taker comes under the "shelter" of a prior holder in due course.
190. The forged check rule in § 3-418 is subordinated to the breach of varranties
section (Q 3-417) and the Article on Bank Deposits and Collections (Article 4). See note
187 supra.
191. See United States v. Chase Nat. Bank, 252 U.S. 4S5 (1920); Frankini v. Bank
of America Nat Trust & Saving Ass'n, 31 Cal. App. 2d tw, :vs P2d 790 (1933) ; Cairo
Bank Co. v. West, 187 Ga. 666, 2 S.E2d 91 (1939); Herbel v. People's State Ban of
Ellinwood, 170 Kan. 620, 228 P2d 929 (1951) ; State Bank v. Cumberland Savings & Trust
Co., 168 N.C. 605, 85 S.E. 5 (1915). Contra: McCall v. Coming, 3 La. Ann. 409 (14);
Farmers Nat. Bank v. Farmers & Traders Bank, 159 Ky. 141, 16bL SV. 925) (1914).
192. Since there is in addition to the forged signature of the maker a forged endorse-
ment, a prior party has breached the warranty "that he has good title to the instrument."
4 3-417 (1) (a), 4-207(1) (a).
193. This result is not inevitable. Courts may regard the subordination device in the
U.C.C. as an inadequate legislative expression of intent to change the common law. See
note 227 infra.
194. Beutel, Comparison of the Proposed Conercial Code, 30 NM. L. Rm. 531, 554-5
(1951).
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though this interpretation seems unjustified. 10 It may also be argued that
the drawee can recover from prior parties by subrogation to the drawer's rights
against the holder of a check. 19 This theory would contend that the purported
drawer had a right to recover from a holder who received money on a forged
check,' 9 7 and that the drawee must be subrogated to this right to prevent his
loss from payment of the check. However, this interpretation also seems un-
likely.'9 8 Finally, since the forged check rule is subordinated to sections
authorizing and effectuating informal agreements between banks,119 abnega-
tion of the rule could result from agreements between banks always to re-
fund payment received for forged checks. 20 0 The collecting bank, having paid
195. The comments to the section suggest that this interpretation was not intended
by the drafters. U.C.C. § 3-418, Comment 1; see note 187 supra. Furthermore a warranty
denied to the drawee, but given to transferees and subsequent holders in good faith, is that
"all signatures are genuine." U.C.C. §§ 3-417(2) (a), 4-207(2) (a). The omission of
this warranty for the protection of the drawee supports the conclusion that the intention
of the Code was not to give the drawee the right to recover for a forged check oil the
warranties accompanying presentment for payment. Finally, existing law would refute
an interpretation based on the premise that parties cannot have good title to a forged
check. Bank of England v. Vagliano Bros., [1891] A.C. 107; Trust Co. of America v.
Hamilton Bank, 127 App. Div. 515, 112 N.Y. Supp. 84 (1st Dep't 1908). The party has
good title to the paper, only the paper is just not enforcible against tile purported drawee
or maker since he did not draw it. Edgington v. Security-First Nat. Bank of Los Angeles,
78 Cal. App2d 849, 179 P.2d 640 (1947); Cowan v. Thompson, 25 Tenn. App. 130, 152
S.W.2d 1036 (1941).
196. "If a payor bank has paid an item over the stop payment order of tile drawer or
maker or otherwise under circumstances giving a basis for objection by the drawer or iiiaker,
to prevent unjust enrichment and only to the extent necessary to prevent loss to the bank
by reason of its payment of the item, the payor bank shall be subrogated to the rights (a)
of any holder in due course on the item against the drawer or maker; and (b) of tile
payee or any other holder of the item against the drawer or maker whether on the item
or under the transaction out of which the item arose; and (c) of the drawer or maker
against the payee or any other holder of the item with respect to the transaction out of
which the item arose." U.C.C. § 4-407 (emphasis added).
197. Such right exists in some jurisdictions. See cases cited notes 71, 178 supra.
198. The intent of the section is to bar recovery by the drawee-see note 195 supra.
And the section, by its wording, may be limited to stop payment orders and/or unjust
enrichment.
199. The forged check rule is subordinated to Article 4 which includes the right of
agreement. See note 187 supra.
200. "The effect of the provisions of this Article [4] may be varied by agreement
except that no agreement can disclaim a bank's responsibility or lit it the measure of
damages for its own lack of good faith or failure to exercise ordinary care." U.C.C.
§ 4-103(1).
"Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 1-102 (3) (b), Federal Reserve regulations
and operating letters, clearing house rules, and the like, have the effect of agreements under
subsection (1), whether or not specifically assented tq by all parties interested in items
handled." U.C.C. § 4-103(2) (emphasis added). See § 1-102(3) (b), note 186 supr,',
Thus, they bind "en masse ...virtually every adult person and business organization
in the United States ...on the principle that collecting banks acting as agents have
authority to make binding agreements with respect to items being handled." U.C.C. § 4-103,
Comment 3.
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the drawee pursuant to agreement, would initiate the chain of suits against
prior parties until the taker from the forger is reached. -? 1 However, the
efficacy of such agreements may be restricted. They may be defeated by a
declaration of unconstitutionality, -20 2 and by argument that banks cannot ad-
versely affect the rights and duties of third parties 2, or disclaim responsi-
bility for failure to exercise ordinary care.2 14 Further, unless the agreements
are made in Federal Reserve Regulations and operating letters or clearing
house rules.205 the agreements may not be binding on depositors under the
Code.20 6 Thus generally, the forged check rule probably remains intact.
The Code purportedly treats forged endorsements as does existing law. -'3T
201. Recovery would be based on the warranty that all signatures were genuine.
U.C.C. §§ 3-417(2) (a), 4-207(2) (a). See note 20S in! ra.
202. See Gilmore, Uniform Commer ial Code: A Reply. 61 YALE -J. 364, 375-6
(1952).
203. Under U.C.C. § 1-102(3) (b) a party cannot be bound by an agreement to which
he has not assented or in which he has no interest. See note 196 supra. Thus, it may be
argued that even if the collecting bank were to agree to allow recovery by the drawee
bank, the collecting bank could not fall back on the party who delivered the chec: for
collection. But this objection would probably fail because third parties' rights can be
affected if the act so provides. Ibid. And the act specifies that parties with an interest,
i.e., the depositors for collection are bound even if they do not specifically assent to the
agreement. See U.C.C. § 4-103, Comments 2, 3; and note 200 supra.
204. U.C.C. § 4-103(1) ; and text at note 200 supra. As this contention would probably
require a showing in each separate case that the bank failed in its duty on the specifically
questioned check, the burden of proof would be exceedingly difficult to sustain. Further-
more, "ordinary care" is what banks usually use, and if all banks operate under the
agreement, this argument would probably fail. The Code provides: "Action or non-action
approved by this Article or pursuant to Federal Reserve regulations or operating letters
constitutes the exercise of ordinary care and, in the absence of special instructions,
action or non-action consistent with clearing house rules and the like or wfth a general
banking usage not disapproved by this Article, prima facie constitutes the exercise of
ordinary care." U.C.C. § 4-103(3) (emphasis supplied).
205. If the agreement is made in Federal Reserve regulations and operating letters or
clearing house rules, any party depositing a check for collection would be bound by the
agreement. U.C.C. § 4-103(2), note 200 supra.
206. The contention would first require a holding that an agreement among banks
pursuant to U.C.C. § 4-103(1), would not by itself bind the parties sending the check
through the collection system. See note 203 s, pra. Then the court would have to find
that the agreement was not like a Federal Reserve regulation, operating letter, or clearing
house rule. See U.C.C. § 4-103 (2), note 200 supra. The comments indicate that an agree-
ment among "a number of banks or even all the banks in an area simply because they are
banks would not itself by virtue of the phrase 'and the like: meet the purposes and objec-
tives of . . ." agreements with ability to bind every participant in the banking process
without regard to the limitations on agreements in the Code. See note 200 supra. Another
argument against the effect of the agreements, even if made through the Federal Reserve
System, is that the instrument and all actions on it have been discharged under U.C.C
§ 3-601(3) when read in conjunction with U.C.C. § 3-418.
207. The Code "retains the generally accepted rule that the party who accepts or pays
does not 'admit' the genuineness of indorsements, and may recover from the person pre-
senting the instrument when they turn out to be forged." U.C.C. § 3417, Comment 3.
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By providing that every transferee warrants that "signatures are genuine"
and the presenter for payment warrants that "he has good title to the in-
strument," the Code permits every party including the drawee to fall back
on prior parties when a forged endorsement occurs. 20 8 Thus the taker from
the forger is left only with his right against the forger. However, the Code
does provide possibilities for modification of the forged endorsement rule.
Parties have a right to stipulate out these warranties established by the Code,
and consequently a taker from the forger who so stipulates in transferring
the check may avoid liability.200 But this possibility of stipulation out of war-
ranties is not available to a person who presents a check to a bank for col-
lection or payment.
210
The U.C.C. substantially follows the existing law of altered instruments.2 1,
Since the presenter for payment and all transferees warrant that "the instru-
208. U.C.C. § 3-417: "Warranties on Presentment and Transfer.
"(1) Unless otherwise agreed any person who obtains payment or acceptance and
any prior transferor warrants to a party who pays or accepts in good faith
(a) that he has a good title to the instrument or is authorized to obtain payment or
acceptance on behalf of one who has a good title; and ...
(c) that the instrument has not been materially altered, and that he has no knowledge
that the signature of the maker or drawer is unauthorized, except that such warranties are
not given by a holder in due course who has taken a draft drawn on and accepted by a bank
after such alteration or signature or by a holder in due course of a note. This exception
applies even though a draft has been accepted 'payable as originally drawn' or in equivalent
terms.
"(2) Unless othervise agreed any party who transfers an instrument for considera-
tion warrants to his transferee and if the transfer is by indorsement to any subsequent
holder who takes the instrument in good faith that
(a) all signatures are genuine or authorized; and
(b) the instrument has not been materially altered; and
(c) the transfer is rightful; and
(d) no defense of any party is good against him; and
(e) he has no knowledge of any insolvency proceeding instituted with respect to tile
maker or acceptor or the drawer of an unaccepted instrument."
209. Such stipulation is possible under U.C.C. § 3-417, which specifies that warranties
apply "unless otherwise agreed."
210. The ability to alter by agreement the warranties given to banks is omitted from
the bank collection warranty section, U.C.C. § 4-207, which is otherwise comparable to
U.C.C. § 3-417, the general warranty section. This statutory protection was particularly
unnecessary since banks could have given themselves the same protection by refusing to
agree to such restrictive warranties.
211. Existing law is discussed at page 424 supra. U.C.C. § 3-407 reads:
"Alteration.
"(1) Any alteration of an instrument is material which changes the contract of any
party thereto in any respect.
"(2) As against any person other than a subsequent holder in due course
(a) alteration by the holder which is both fraudulent and material discharges any
party whose contract is thereby changed unless that party assents or is precluded from
asserting the defense;
(b) no other alteration discharges any party and the instrument may be enforced
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ment has not been materially altered," in the absence of negligence all parties
can fall back until the taker from the forger bears the loss.2 m  This is con-
sistent with one line of decisions in existing law, but rejects the rule of some
jurisdictions placing loss on the drawee for the full amount of a check, where
the payee's name is altered and for the raised amount when the amount i's
changed.2 13 In the absence of negligence, as under existing law, the original
tenor of the altered instrument may be charged to the drawer by the drawee
bank 214 or enforced against the drawer by a former holder.2 10
To the extent that it preserves existing rules based on allocation by type
of forgery, the Code is subject to the same objections as existing law for its
failure to serve goals involving transferability, risk distribution, negligence, and
uniform treatment of parties.21 0 Indeed, the comments to the Code, in strain-
ing to offer justification for its structure, present contradictory rationales.
Admitting the fictional nature of the argument that the drawee can verify
the signature of the drawer, the comments to the forged check rule affirm that
the loss should be placed on the drawee to "end the transaction on an instru-
ment when it is paid rather than reopen and upset a series of commercial
transactions at a later date when the forgery is discovered."21 7 At the same
time, the comments on the section embodying the forged endorsement and
altered instrument rules, which allow the drawee to recover, state the con-
verse: "drawee is in a position to verify the drawers signaltirc by comparison
with one in his hands, but has ordinarily no opportunity to verify an endorse-
according to its original tenor, or as to incomplete instruments according to the authority
given.
"(3) A subsequent holder in due course may in all cases enforce the instrument ac-
cording to its original tenor, and when an incomplete instrument has been completed, he
may enforce it as completed."
Since a person only becomes a holder in due course by following reasonable business
conduct or taking from a person who was a holder in due course-see notes 1&,-9 sura-
only these persons may enforce the instrument according to its original tenor.
212. U.C.C. §§ 3-417, 4-207. See note 203 spra.
213. There is a split in existing cases vith the majority allowing a drawee to recover
funds paid on an altered instrument. See notes 32, 35 sapra. The U.C.C. resolves this
conflict in favor of the majority view. § 3-417.
214. "A bank which in good faith makes payment to a holder may charge the indicated
account of its customer according to (a) the original tenor of his altered item." U.C.C.
§ 4-401.
215. U.C.C. § 3-407(3), note 211 supra.
216. Uniformity of doctrine between states would of course be obtained by general
enactment of the U.C.C. However parties who act similarly in analogous situations are
still treated differently. See discussion pages 440, 443-4 spra. On criticism relating to other
objectives, see pages 440-7 supra.
217. U.C.C. § 3-41S, Comment 1.
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ment. ' '2 18 Nor can it be supposed that reopening the transactions on a check
with a forged endorsement is any less unsettling than similar action on a
forged check;219 yet the draftsmen do not think that objective significant
enough to consider in the forged endorsement and alteration comments. The
contradiction, of course, suggests the inability of the codifiers to justify dif-
ferent rules for different types of forgery.,
Where the Code may introduce modifications of the existing forged check rule
its results are even less desirable than existing law. All four possible modi-
fications to the forged check rule-recovery on double forgery checks, re-
covery under breach of warranty, subrogation, and agreements to refund-
shift loss away from the drawee bank without any basis in negligence, and in
fact may permit even a negligent drawee to shift its loss to others.220 These
restrictions on the drawee bank's liAbility for forged checks also defeat the
goal of promoting most effective risk distribution, and, by shifting the loss to
prior transferees, impair transferability. The possibility of an agreement to
refund made by banks is particularly objectionable as a means of attempting
intelligent and equitable loss allocation since it permits banks in their own
self-interest to determine the liability of others.
221
The change in the forged endorsement rule-stipulation out of warranties
-fails to advance substantially existing law. Only transferability is furthered
by this change which shifts the loss away from the taker from the forger.122 But
since the change fails to shift the loss to the drawee bank, the best risk dis-
tribution is not obtained. Moreover, the change has no basis in negligence.
Stipulation may permit a negligent party to shift the loss to another, but the
other party may protect himself by refusing to agree to the restriction of the
218. U.C.C. § 3-417, Comment 3.
219. Under the forged endorsement rule the time in which an action may be brought
is extensive. See, e.g., Teas v. Third Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 125 N.J. Eq. 224, 4 A.2d
64 (Ct. Err. & App. 1939) (payee's suit in conversion against collecting bank allowed after
7 years) ; Henderson v. Lincoln Rochester Trust Co., 303 N.Y. 27, 100 N.E.2d 117 (1951)
(payee suing collecting bank under contract theory has up to 6 years).
220. The subrogation section has no requirement that the bank be free from negligence
before it may take advantage of its provisions. In fact when a bank does pay over a stop
order, it has usually been careless; yet the section clearly is meant to apply here. U.C.C.
§ 4-407, note 196 suira. There is no requirement of freedom from negligence in dis-
covering forgeries or alterations before the bank may take advantage of the warranties.
U.C.C. §§ 3-417, 4-207; see note 208 supra. Once having discovered the forgery, however,
the bank must act in a reasonable time or is barred from recovering the extent of the loss
caused by the delay in making claim. U.C.C. § 4-207(4) ; see note 239 itira. Negligence
requirements for agreements are discussed in note 204 supra.
221. The "agreement" sections of the Code have been criticized by the Code's
staunchest defenders. See, e.g., Gilmore, Uniform Commercial Code: A Reply, 61 YALE
L.J. 364, 375 (1952).
222. See discussion pages 434-5 supra. Transferability may be underminied if
the warranties are interpreted to eliminate the defense of material change of position,




warranty. While it is true that ability to stipulate out of warranties does pro-
vide a flexible arrangement enabling parties to model their liability to the
type of commercial transaction in which they are involved, in practice this
may mean only that a party with superior bargaining power can secure a
restriction of his liability. Here, as another indication of the favored treat-
ment afforded banks by the forgery sections of the Code, the edge in bargaining
power cannot be exercised by one who presents a check to a bank for col-
lection or payment.22
3
The U.C.C. adopts the less desirable of the two existing views regarding
altered instruments. By adopting the view that drawees can fall back on prior
parties, the Code defeats most effective risk distribution and transferabilit-.
And while the Code may operate to place the loss on a taker who was in fact
negligent, it also places the loss on non-negligent takers. In contrast, the
rejected line of cases placing loss on the drawee insulates both negligent and
non-negligent takers, but promotes transferability and most effective risk
distribution.
Allocation Mo'dified by Negligence Concepts. The Uniform Commercial
Code superimposes negligence concepts on its basic allocation structure. While
these concepts encompass many of the negligence doctrines prevalent in exist-
ing law, the Code also introduces several changes. Two of these changes-
i.e., rules relating to negligence of drawers and payees in contributing to
forgery and negligence of a drawer in failing to report a forgery-modify
allocation regardless of the type of forgery involved. Other changes made by
the Code apply specifically to forged instruments or forged endorsements.
The Code provides that drawers and payees whose negligence "substantially
contributes" to a material alteration or forgery cannot assert the alteration
or forgery against a party who took an instrument for value, in good faith,
and in observance of reasonable standards of his business32 This provision
can be invoked, for example, to place the loss on a drawer who created an
instrument which could be easily altered, who mismailed a check which then
had a forged endorsement placed upon it, or who has notice that his name has
been forged and fails to prevent subsequent forgeries by the same person.5
Additionally, the doctrine may place liability on a payee where his similar
223. Warranties given banks cannot bu varied by agreement U.C.C. § 4-207. See
note 210 supra.
224. "Any person who by his negligence substantially contributes to a material
alteration of the instrument or to the making of an unauthorized signature is precluded
from asserting the alteration or lack of authority against a holder in due course or
against a drawee or other payor who pays the instrument in good faith and in accordance
with the reasonable commercial standards of the drawee's or payor's business.' U.C.C.
§ 3-406.
225. The existing case law on this subject is in conflict. See cases on careless creation
in notes 64 and 65 szupra; cases on negligent mailing in note 152 supra; cases on inadequate
supervision in notes 58 and 59 supra.
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conduct facilitates the forging of his endorsement. 20 While the specific ex-
amples suggested may now provide grounds for liability in some jurisdictions,
the Code introduces change in so far as it carries all of these existing negli-
gence concepts to all jurisdictions. However, the full impact of the general-
ized negligence doctrine is partly contingent upon interpretations courts will
give to such terms as "substantially contributes." Some courts may read into
these terms already existing doctrine and its limitations and hence nullify
any new impact of the Code.22 7 Thus, for example, some courts may still find
that the intervening criminal act of forgery precludes a determination that
the negligence of a drawer who mismailed a check substantially contributed to
a forged endorsement. 228 However, few courts are likely to limit the Code
in this manner.220 Courts may also limit the negligence doctrine by holding
"shelter" provisions applicable. In some circumstances under these provisions
a party who negligently takes a check is given the same protection as if he
had exercised care, providing some prior party did exercise care. 2 0 A col-
lecting bank, for example, which takes an instrument proper business
practice would have demanded it to refuse, may effectively resist recovery
from a negligent drawer or payee if any party prior to the bank took the check
for value and in good faith and exercised care in handling the instrument. 231
In any event, the general negligence doctrine of the Code does carry with it
a concept, analogous to contributory negligence, that is to some extent novel.
Parties are prevented from shifting loss to a negligent drawer or payee if
the parties have themselves obtained the check without exercising reasonable
care. 232
226. This is in accord with the preferred view. See cases cited notes 62, 63 supra.
227. The practice of strictly construing statutes in derogation of the common law
is familiar. See e.g., Colonial Trust Co. v. National Bank, 50 Pa. Super. 510 (1912).
228. See Fitzgibbons Boiler Co. v. Nat. City Bank, 287 N.Y. 326,39 N.E.2d 897 (1942);
Glasscock v. First Nat. Bank of San Angelo, 114 Tex. 207, 266 S.W. 393 (1924). Contra:
Provident Savings Bank & Trust Co. v. Western & Southern Life Ins. Co., 41 Ohio App.
261, 179 N.E. 815 (1931). See cases cited notes 57 and 59 supra.
229. Such an interpretation is contrary to the conments: "[The section] rejects
decisions which have held that the maker of a note owes no duty of care to holder because
at the time the instrument is drawn there is no contract between them." U.C.C. § 3-406,
Comment 2. It also contravenes the policy behind the section that a person who is careless in
creating or delivering an instrument is creating a hazard to all parties who may come in
contact with the check and so is justifiably responsible for any loss which occurs.
230. See note 189 supra.
231. This result is contrary to the comments, one of which states: "Thus any bank
which takes or pays an altered instrument which ordinary banking standards would
require it to refuse cannot take advantage of the estoppel." UC.C. § 3-406, Comment 6.
But the result seems inevitable due to the clear intent of the text since, in case of conflict
between text and comments, the text controls. See U.C.C. § 1-102(3) (f), note 186 supra.
232. This is accomplished since only a holder in due course gets the protection, and a
holder only becomes a holder in due course by exercise of proper business methods. U.C.C.
§ 3-302(1). See note 188 supra.
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The Code also embodies a negligence doctrine which imposes on the drawer.
in all types of forgery cases, a duty to discover and notify the drawee bank,
within specified time limits, of alterations and forgeries.2- 3 Within these time
limits a drawer may still be held liable if he fails to exercise "reasonable care
to examine the statement and items" in order to discover forgery and prompt-
ly notify the bank after discovery. In most cases a drawer who fails to dis-
cover and notify within ninety days is precluded from having his account re-
credited for any forgeries or alterations repeated by the same person. In occa-
sional cases where illness, absence from the country or other similar cause
prevents the drawer from examining his statement, he has up to a year to
discover and report. And in the case of a forged endorsement the drawer
has three years before he is precluded from asserting the forgery against the
bank. To gain protection of these time limits the bank must exercise only
good faith. However, all of the time limits may be modified by the Code's
"informal agreements" section; banks may uniformly agree to impose on their
depositors a period, within which notice must be given,234 that may run as
short as ten days or two weeks.3
233. U.C.C. § 4-406 reads: "Cuestomer's Duly to Discover and Report Unallhoriocd
Signature or Alteration.
"(1) Where a bank sends to its customer a statement of account accompanied by
items paid in good faith....
(a) the customer must excrcise reasonable care to examine the statement and items
to discover his unauthorized signature or any alteration and must notify the ban: promptly
after discovery thereof; he is liable to the bank for any loss suffered by it which results
from his failure to do so; and
(b) except as provided in subsection (2) a customer who does not within ninety
days discover and report his unauthorized signature or any material alteration on the face
of any such item is precluded from asserting against the bank both such unauthorized signa-
ture or alteration by the same person on items paid in good faith by the bad: subZequent to
the sending of the first item or notice to the customer of any such signature or alteration;
and
(c) without regard to subsection (2) a customer who does not within one year dkcover
and report his unauthorized signature or any alteration on the face or back of the item or
within three years any unauthorized indorsement, is precluded from asserting against the
bank such unauthorized signature or indorscment or such alteration.
"(2) Except as provided in subsection (1) (c) a customer who has not for good cause
exmined such statement and items may within thirty days after such cause ceases to
operate demand recredit or repayment for the amounts paid on items materially altered
or bearing his unauthorized signature." (Emphasis supplied.)
234. On the ability of banks to bind depositors by agreements see notes 200, 23-6 supra.
235. Many banks include in their depositor's contract or statement of account returned
with cancelled checks a provision that the account will be considered zettlcd if no notice
is received within ten days or two weeks. The Code apparently intends to supezde cur-
rent laws in which these agreements between banks and their depositors have with great
frequency been given short shrift. See, e.g., Worthen Bank & Trust Co. v. Kelly-Nelson
Construction Co., - Ark. -, 245 S.W2d 405 (1952) (agreement to report in 10 days on
monthly statement of account not endorsed); Frankini v. Bank of America Nat. Trust
& Savings Ass'n, 31 Cal. App.2d 666, S P.2d 790 (1939) (signed agreement for 10 days
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While most jurisdictions today, through one device or another, impose
similar duties on the drawer, °6 the Code establishes uniform time periods,
presumably unifies the grounds for liability, and permits a modification of the
time limits by its "informal agreement" authorization. Again, however, the
full impact of the Code is not ascertainable without judicial interpretation, for
common-law rules may readily be read into the Code provisions. In situa-
tions where a drawer-employer has delegated the duty of examining checks
to an employee who participates in the forgery, for example, will the em-
ployer's duty of "reasonable care" be discharged by initially prudent conduct
in selecting the employee and delegating duty,237 or will the employer never-
theless be held liable ?2 If the delegation is held not to relieve the drawer, the
Code is ambiguous in indicating whether his failure to discover and report bars
him after ninety days, or whether the delegation of authority constitutes an
excuse for not personally examining the statement which will thus allow the
drawer a full year before he is precluded from having his account recredited.
The Code also adopts some negligence standards relating to the conduct
of the drawee. As under existing law, a drawee bank which has learned of
a forgery must promptly notify other parties.2 39 Failure so to notify will shift
the loss occasioned by the delay to the drawee when it may have had grounds
for recovery against others.24 0 However, the Code has not included the rules
notification not enforced because bank did not call it to depositor's attention and it is art
unreasonable advantage achieved by imposition) ; First Nat. Bank of Atlanta v. American
Surety Co., 71 Ga. App. 112, 30 S.E2d 402 (1944) (10 day notification agreement on
returned voucher not enforced even though depositor signed receipt with voucher);
Denbigh v. First Nat. Bank, 102 Wash. 546, 174 Pac. 475 (1918) (agreement to limit
time strictly construed because of existence of statute cutting off actions after 60 days).
Contra: Brunswick Corp. v. Northwestern Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 214 Minn. 370, 8
N.W.2d 333 (1943) (10 day agreement enforced against employer in embezzlement scheme
even though there was a state six month statute of limitations and the drawee bank was
negligent); McCormick v. Rapid City Nat. Bank, 67 S.D. 586, 297 N.W. 39 (1941) (15 day
agreement upheld wheie it was part of signed contract).
236. See notes 39-43a, 55, 56, 176 supra.
237. Merchants' Nat. Bank v. Nichols & Shepard Co., 223 Il. 41, 79 N.E. 38 (1906) ;
Kenneth Investment Co. v. National Bank, 103 Mo. App. 613, 77 S.W. 1002 (1903). See
cases cited note 148 supra.
238. See General Cigar Co. v. First Nat. Batk, 290 Fed. 143 (9th Cir. 1923) ; First
Nat. Bank v. Richmond Electric Co., 106 Va. 347, 56 S.E. 152 (1907). See also cases
cited notes 125, 149, 150.
239. U.C.C. § 4-207(4) : "Unless a claim for breach of warranty under this section is
made within a reasonable time after the person claiming learns of the breach, the person
liable is discharged to the extent of any loss caused by the delay in making claim," For
the scope of the breach of warranty involved see note 208 supra.
240. Cases under existing law reaching the same result include: Guaranty Bond
State Bank of Athens v. Fraternal Bank & Trust Co., 68 S.W.2d 305 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934)
(recovery reduced by loss caused when delay enabled forger to withdraw funds from de-
fendant collecting bank) ; cf. Pennsylvania Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Real Estate-Land Title
& Trust Co., 116 Pa. Super. 81, 176 At. 747 (1935) (drawee not barred by I( day delay
where no harm sustained).
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that hold the drawee liable when it has been negligent in other ways, such as
failing to discover a forgeddrawer's signature.2"4
In addition to negligence concepts applicable regardless of the type of for-
gery, the Code also introduces modifications of current negligence exceptions
to the forged check, forged endorsement and altered instrument rules.
In forged check cases the U.C.C. adopts the rule existing in many juris-
dictions that drawee bank may recover money paid on a forged check and
resist payment of an accepted forged check when dealing with a party who failed
to meet commercial standards applicable to his business when he took the
check.24 Then, since each party may fall back on his transferee, the loss is
finally shifted to the taker from the forger. - 43 This Code provision is narrower
than one existing view which holds that recovery can always be obtained un-
less the prior party has changed his position in reliance on payment.2 14 And
the provision additionally excludes operation of any other negligence theory
for recovery. However, it broadens the drawee's right to reimbursement in
jurisdictions that recognized no negligence exception."'
In forged endorsement cases, the Code places loss on the drawer in the
same situations as the Fictitious Payee Act discussed above, -"40 although its
rationale differs from that of the Act.2 47 The Code also broadens the "im-
postor" exception to the forged endorsement rule, thus enlarging responsi-
bility of the drawer to the benefit of the taker from the forger. The justi-
fication for holding the drawer liable for delivering to an impostor is changed
from the previous rationale that the drawer "intended" to pay the impostor, 9
to the statement that regardless of drawer's intent, the endorsement of an
241. See note 220 smpra. Compare existing law at notes 44, 159 supra.
242. U.C.C. § 3-418, note 193 stpra. See note, 18, and 1.) supra for requirement of
good business practice.
243. U.C.C. § 3-417(2) (a), note 203 supra.
244. Union Nat. Bank v. Farmers' & Mechanics' Nat Bank, 271 Pa. 107, 114 Adt. §eri
(1921) ; National Loan & Exchange Bank of Columbia v. Lachovitz, 131 S.C. 430, 120
S.E. 10 (1925); Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Corpus Christi Nat. Bank, 186 S.,V2d
840 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944).
245. See cases cited note 143 supra.
246. See text at notes 167-75 supra. U.C.C. § 3-405 reads: "Impostors; Sg;:ature in
Name of Payee.
"(1) An indorsement by any person in the name of a named payee is effective if
(a) an impostor by the use of the mails ur otherwise has induced the maker or dra%,,er
to issue the instrument to him or his confederate in the name of the payee; or
(b) a person signing as or on behalf of a drawer intends the payee to have no interest
in the instrument; or
(c) an agent or employee of the drawer has supplied him with the name of the payee
intending the latter to have no such interest.
"(2) Nothing in this section shall affect the criminal or civil liability of the person
so indorsing."
247. The Fictitious Payee Act makes the check payable to bearer---see note 167 supra
-while the U.C.C. makes the indorsement of the forger effective. See note 246 supra.
248. See cases cited note 49 supra.
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impostor is effective.249 Doctrinally, this explains the Code's extension of the
drawer's liability to the previously uncovered situations in which the imposture
was made through the mail or where delivery was to a confederate of the
party forging an endorsement. 25
0
For altered checks, the U.C.C. introduces the rule that, aside from the
drawee bank,251 only a party who has obtained an instrument in accordance
with the reasonable standards of his business or who has obtained an instru-
ment from one who has exercised similar care can enforce the original tenor
of the check.252 Under existing lav only good faith was necessary to enforce
the original tenor against the drawer.253 To the extent that this will reduce
the ability of prior parties to enforce checks, it shifts part of the loss from
the drawer to the taker from the forger.
The negligence modifications adopted by the Code represent some improve-
ment over existing law in attaining the goal of placing loss on negligent
parties. In so far as the Code introduces new negligence concepts and extends
existing rules, the likelihood that a negligent party will sustain loss is, of
course, increased. Thus the doctrine of negligence contributing to loss, the
duty to discover and report forgeries, and the requirement of reasonable busi-
ness care in accepting instruments are all steps forward towards ensuring
allocation based on negligence.2 4 However, the Code's negligence provisions
are far from perfect, and in some instances they directly thwart allocation
according to negligence.
Under the automatic termination of drawee bank's liability to the drawer, 056
the Code places loss on innocent parties even where others are negligent. If
courts read the Code to place loss on a drawer who "misplaces" trust, a
drawer who exercised prudent business conduct in hiring a dishonest employee
and delegating to him the supervision of the checking account may be unable
249. U.C.C. § 3-405(1) (a), note 246 supra.
250. Existing law frequently did not invoke the impostor rule in these situations. See
cases cited note 48 suPra. However, the U.C.C. does preserve the exception that when
an impostor represents himself to be another person's agent and the check is made out to
the purported principal, the drawer is protected. U.C.C. § 3-405, Comment 2. See cases
cited note 48 supra.
251. U.C.C. § 4-401, note 214 supra.
252. The Code provides that only a holder in due course may enforce the original
tenor. U.C.C. § 3-407. To become a holder in due course a party must exercise reasonable
commercial care. See notes 188, 189 supra.
253. Under existing law a holder in due course could enforce the original tenor.
NIL § 124. However, to become a holder in due course a party only had to exercise
good faith, not "commercial care." NIL § 52. See Howard Nat. Bank v. Wilson, 96 Vt.
438, 120 Atl. 889 (1923).
254. Respectively U.C.C. §§ 3-406, 4-207(4), 4-406(1) (a), 3-302(1)(b).
255. U.C.C. § 4-406, note 224 supra.
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to recover funds from the drawee. 0  And a non-negligent drawer will also
bear loss where extenuating circumstances make his failure to report "reason-
able" even though the time limit has expired. Here, the Code is particularly
objectionable, since even if the drawee has been negligent, the prudent drawer
sustains the loss.257 Moreover, in a forged endorsement situation, the knowl-
edge of the forgery may rest exclusively with the payee or his agent. But
though it is the payee, not the drawer, who fails to report the forgery, the
drawer will be barred from recovering against the drawee.259
The exception to the forged check rule, permitting a drawee to shift loss
to a negligent party, is too narrow to ensure always placing loss on negligent
parties. A person who took from the forger may negotiate his check to an-
other person who sends the check in for collection, or may present the check
for collection at a bank which allows him to draw on it before the forgery
is discovered. Here, the drawee cannot recover from the collecting bank or
a careful party who took the check from a negligent taker; nor can it sue the
negligent taker directly.253 Thus the intervention of innocent parties may
operate to protect the taker.2 0c The Code might easily have remedied this
weakness by providing that a party who did not exercise proper business care
in taking the instrument warranted to the drawee that all signatures were
genuine. This unquestionably would have allowed the drawee to bypass the
intervening parties and sue the taker.
The impostor and fictitious payee rules further exemplify the Code's use
of concepts which may place loss on prudent people where others are negli-
gent in handling a check. Extension of the impostor rule to cover situations
where imposture is by mail or delivery is to a confederate does eliminate a
distinction in liability unrelated to conduct.2 1  Nevertheless, the rule still
retains its absolute allocation of loss to the drawer regardless of his conduct
and the conduct of others associated with the check. Consequently, the same
objections apply as those regarding existing law: a drawer will bear loss not
256. See discussion in text at notes 237- supra.
257. Under Article 4, while the depositor must use reasonable care to discover the
forgery the duty of the drawee bank is only to exercise good faith. See U.C.C. § 4-406,
note 239 supra. Current law in many jurisdictions does not permit a negligent drawee
to take advantage of the negligence of other parties. See cases cited notes 44, 153 upra.
258. Currently, in some jurisdictions the drawer will be protected from ultimate loss
since the payee's action against him is barred. Then the forged check will have operated
to discharge the drawer's obligation to the payee and the latter will sustain the burden.
Mills v. Hurley Hardware & Furniture Co., 129 Ark. 350, 196 S.W. 121 (1917) ; McFadden
v. Follrath, 114 Minn. 85, 130 N.W. 542 (1911). See discussion in Corker, Rish of Less
From, Forged Indorsenwnts, 4 STAN. L REv. 24, 32-42 (1951).
259. See notes 47, 70 supra; and U.C.C. §§ 3417, 4-207.
260. The innocent parties become holders in due course who are protected under
U.C.C. § 3418. A collecting bank becomes a holder in due course when it extends credit
on an item given for collection on the first in first out rule. U.C.C. §§ 4-209, 4-203(3).
261. U.C.C. § 3-405, note 246 supra. However, the Code does nut abolish all distinc-
tions in liability in impostor situations. See note 250 supra.
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only where he is not negligent,2 2 but where others are negligent.20 3  The
identical criticism applies to the Code's treatment of the fictitious payee rule.
Again the difficulty can be easily remedied. Applying a portion of the Code's
general negligence philosophy, one who fails to exercise reasonable commercial
care should not be permitted to take advantage of a negligence rule to recover.
The negligence modification of the altered instrument rule allows a drawee,
despite its negligence, to enforce the original tenor of an instrument against
the drawer.2 4 This may create a double liability for the drawer since he may
still be obligated to the payee on the underlying transaction for which the
check was initially issued. In these situations, charging the original tenor to
the drawer shifts the forgery loss to him. Since the drawee in taking and
paying an instrument should exercise only the highest care, it seems palpably
unreasonable to allow a drawee who may have negligently taken a check from
the forger or paid an obviously altered instrument to recover from a prudent
drawer. There appears to be no reason why the drawee is not required, as
are other parties who attempt to enforce the original tenor of the instrument,
to have exercised reasonable commercial care.
265
Since, with the single exception of the rule requiring the drawee to give
prompt notice of discovered forgeries, the Code's negligence modifications
place loss on parties other than the drawee, most effective risk distribution is
impeded. Generally, this result can be justified if the objective of allocating
loss according to negligence is deemed paramount. However, as pointed out
above, in many situations, the Code's "negligence" provisions in fact place
loss on careful parties. Here, the priority of a negligence objective is patently
inapplicable as justification for shifting loss away from the drawee. Thus, for
example, preventing recovery from the drawee by a prudent drawer due to
the statute of limitations 20 6 or permitting a negligent drawee to charge a
drawer for the original tenor of an instrument,20 7 not only defeat negligence
objectives, but frustrate effective risk distribution without cause. Moreover,
where both the drawee and other parties are negligent, the Code frequently
shifts loss to the others, as, for example, where both drawer and drawee are
negligent in discovering a forged or altered check,2 0 8 or where a negligent
262. See cases cited note 139 supra.
263. See case cited note 140 surpra, and discussion note 50 supra.
264. All the drawee must exercise is good faith. U.C.C. § 4-401, note 214 supra.
265. Courts may avoid this result since U.C.C. §§ 3-407 and 4-401 are contradictory.
The former specifies that "As against any person other than a subsequent holder in due
course (a) alteration ...discharges any party whose contract is thereby changed."
(Emphasis supplied.) Since the drawee is not a holder in due course, a court could resolve
the conflict denying effect to § 4-401 unless the bank exercised reasonable business care or
took from a holder in due course. Contrast U.C.C. § 3-406 in which the drawee bank must
exercise due care before it may debit a negligent drawer's account on an alteration or forgery.
See note 224 supra.
266. See U.C.C. § 4-406, note 233 supra; and discussion at notes 257-8 supra.
267. U.C.C. § 4-401, note 214 srupra; and discussion at note 264 supra.
268. U.C.C. § 4-406, note 233 supra.
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drawee may recover from a negligent prior party on a forged check.2c9 Again,
risk distribution is thwarted without justification.
Transferability is furthered by the Code's doctrines which place the loss
on negligent drawers and payees, though to some e-x-tent reluctance initially
to use checks may result.2" But even where transferability is theoretically
stymied by making a negligent taker bear the loss due to his carelessness, -ro t for
example, the U.C.C. is justified if allocation by negligence is considered
a more important objective. And, in practice, since a taker will know that he
will be protected by following the prudent practices of his business, placing
the loss on negligent takers should not unduly restrict transferability.
By providing a single set of rules for all jurisdictions, the Code provides
uniformity in an area in which different courts have established many con-
flicting doctrines. However, there is a real likelihood that varying interpre-
tations of some sections of the Code will reintroduce diversity. For example.
courts may introduce variations by their construction of the terms "negli-
gence" and "substantially contributes" in the section placing loss on negligent
drawers and payees.272  While the omission of a definition of "negligence"
is understandable, objection can justifiably be made to the failure to include
in the text of the Code some criteria for giving substance to the phrase "sub-
stantially contributes. -2 73 Diverse interpretation may also arise in the appli-
cation of the care which a drawer must take in discovering and reporting
forged and altered instruments to his bank, and in application of the Code',
time periods.274 Again, clarity of statement would have obviated this difficulty.
Finally, there is the variation that may arise even within a single jurisdiction
from construction of general terms such as "reasonable commercial stand-
ards"27 and "reasonable care.127 6 This, however, is the inevitable penalty for
selecting flexible doctrines.
Because of a pronounced favoritism for banks, the Code's negligence sections
completely fail to provide uniform treatment for parties behaving similarly.
Not only are negligent banks given protection in situations where other parties
269. The Code clearly permits a drawee to recover from a prior party who did not
exercise good faith or reasonable commercial care. § 3-418, note 187 suipra. The Eection
and comments fail to limit the right of recovery to only careful drawees. It is pozsible,
however, that courts will read the common law prohibition against negligent drawee's
recovering into the U.C.C. See notes 44, 158 supra.
270. U.C.C. § 3-405, note 246 smpra; § 3-406, note 224 supra; § 4-406(1), note 233
sup ra.
271. U.C.C. § 3-302(1) (b), note 18 suopra, operating through §§ 3-406, 3-407.
272. U.C.C. § 3406, note 224 snpra.
273. The comments fill the void to some extent by giving some examples including
negligent drawing of an instrument and negligence in protecting a signature stamp. U.C.C.
§ 3-406, Comments 1, 7.
274. U.C.C. § 4-406, note 233 supra; and discussion in text at notes 237 et seq. sepra.
275. U.C.C. § 3-302(1) (b), note 18S repra.
276. U.C.C. § 4-406(1) (a), note 233 supra.
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would be held liable,277 but they are protected by the ability to impose agreements
limiting a drawer's right to recover to ten days 218 or by an absolute statute of
limitations against actions by the drawer.279 The latter is justified by the Code
as desirable to put at rest transactions arising from checks.2 8 0 But until the
ordinary state statute of limitations applying to actions on negotiable instru-
ments has run, the drawer and drawee are liable on an action by the payee ;21
and prior parties are liable not only to the payee,282 but also to the drawee 2 1
and the drawer. 4 If there should be a policy "in favor of the mechanical termi-
nation of the liability of the bank," it equally applies to the termination of
liability of all parties to the check. The only justifiable treatment of this prob-
lem would be a shortened statute of limitations on all actions arising from the
forgery whether the actions are based on the instrument or on the underlying
transactions.
28 5
Allocation Modified by Availability of Defense. The Code continues exist-
ing practice of permitting the peculiar availability of defenses to modify loss
allocation. Clearly, the Code permits the drawee bank to waive the drawer's
lack of timely notice of forgery and then to proceed against prior parties who
cannot assert the negligence against the drawee.28 6 Similarly, the ability of a
collecting bank to waive the defense of payment by the drawee on a forged
277. U.C.C. § 4-401(2) (a), note 214 supra; and discussion in text at notes 264-5
mupro.
278. U.C.C. § 4-103; see notes 234-5 supra.
279. U.C.C. § 4-406, note 233 supra.
280. The Comment to U.C.C. § 4-406 says about the statute limiting recovery on
forged and altered checks: "It is based . . . upon the obvious desirability of terminating
bank transactions after a relatively short period. . . ." On the cut off statute for forged
endorsements the Comment remarks: "The three year absolute time limit on the discovery
of forged endorsements should be ample, because in the great preponderance of cases the
customer will learn of the forged endorsements within this time and if in any exceptional
case he does not, the balance in favor of a mechanical termination of the liability of the
bank outweighs what few residuary risks the customer may still have." U.C.C. § 4-406,
Comments 6, 8.
281. On the ability of the payee to sue the drawer see cases cited notes, 10, 23 supra.
The right of the payee to sue the drawee in conversion under the U.C.C. is settled, U.C.C.
§ 3-419(1) (c), although under common law there was diversity of viewpoint. See note
24 supra.
282. The payee has recovered against the collecting bank in actions in conversion up
to 7 years. See note 195 supra. Under the U.C.C. the payee's right against a collecting bank
who acts with good faith and reasonable commercial care is limited to the amount of any
proceeds remaining in its hands. U.C.C. § 3-419(3).
283. The drawee may sue even though it has waived the statutory period voluntarily.
See note 67 supra.
284. Beyond the statutory period the drawer may have an action against prior parties.
See notes 71, 72 supra.
285. A drawer might have to refund money to a payee without his usual right of
recovery against the bank. This contingency is admitted by the draftsmen. U.C.C. § 4-406,
Comment 8, note 280 supra.
286. U.C.C. § 4-406, note 233 supra.
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instrument and then recover from prior parties who are unable to shift loss
still exists.2 7 And as previously pointed out, this waiver may even be
hardened into firm practice under the Code by agreements between banks always
to refund payment on forged instruments. An additional possibility of
waiver may occur when a negligent drawer, whose negligence substantially
contributed to the loss, persuades his bank to recredit his account and to fall
back on prior parties.- s The Code also continues the practice of preventing
negligence pleas by certain parties even when the negligent person is before
the court. Of course, in so far as the Code does retain the existing law's peculiar
availability of defenses, the criticism of existing law is equally apropos for
the Code.
Additionally, the U.C.C. has introduced a peculiar change in the ability of
the payee to sue other parties. While it affirms the right of the payee to sue
the drawee bank in conversion for paying on a forged endorsement,2 39 it gives
a collecting bank who exercises reasonable care a defense against the payee for
the amount of any proceeds not remaining in the bank's hands. -0  Since
the collecting bank is not given this defense against the drawee, if the payee
succeeds in collecting from the drawee, the drawee will be able to recover the
full amount of the instrument from the collecting bank.-' Thus, this change
seems only to create needless circuity of action.
While the Code has been subject to severe criticism for failure to secure
desirable objectives, actually many of the Code's major defects stem from
Article 4: the sections on the bank collection process. True, the Code does
retain a basic structure of allocation geared to the type of forgery, and the
peculiar availability of defenses. In this, it possesses many of the defects of
existing law. The imposition of Article 4, however, makes the Code even
less desirable than existing law. The variation introduced by the agreements
287. See text at notes 200-6 supra.
28S. The text of the Code supports this possibility since only the "person who by
his negligence substantially contributes to a material alteration . . . or to the maldng
of an unauthorized signature is precluded from asserting the alteration or lad: of
authority. . . ." U.C.C. § 3-406. Courts have interpreted somewhat similar statutes
prescribing a statutory time limit vithin which the drawer must give his bank notice of
forgery to allow the drawee to waive and fall back on prior parties. See cases cited note
67 supra. However such an interpretation would defeat the underlying policy of the
section which is that the drawer owes a duty of care to all parties who may have come
in contact with the instrument. See note 221 supra. Thus, the bank should not b2 pr-
mitted to w.aive a defense designed to protect others.
289. U.C.C. § 3-419(1) (c). The drawee's liability is limited to the face amount of
the instrument. U.C.C. § 3-419(2).
290. U.C.C. § 3-419(3); see note 292 supra.
291. Recovery is under the warranty given by the collecting bank to the drawee ban!:
that it has good title to the item. U.C.C. § 4-207(1) (a).
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section is the worst offender. And the Article also includes the sections that
permit a drawee to recover when it only exercises good faith in situations
where others must be free from negligence in order to bring suit. Thus the
elimination of Article 4 would unquestionably make the Code a more accept-
able substitute for existing law-especially in light of the Code's improved
negligence sections. However, while the Code without Article 4 might offer
some improvement over existing law, it nevertheless remains a wholly inade-
quate vehicle for allocating forgery losses.
SUGGESTED PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
One of the most effective ways of striking at the problem of losses from
check forgeries is to reduce the possibility of successful forgery. To accom-
plish this purpose, it is proposed that a new form of drawing checks--"restric-
tive drawing"-be utilized. A check restrictively drawn would be an instru-
ment drawn to the payee for deposit only at his bank. Such a check, whether
stolen from the mails or taken by an impostor, would be of no value to the
forger unless he had an account in the name of the payee at the payee's
bank. Not only would it be unlikely that the forger would possess such
an account, but should he attempt to open one, the coincidence of two
parties with identical names at the same bank would certainly subject the
forger to close scrutiny and enhance the likelihood of his being discovered.
It is true that in a "fictitious payee" situation the forger may open an account
in the name of the fictitious payee. This possibility of circumventing the pro-
tection of the restrictively drawn check can be minimized by requiring banks
to exercise some care in opening strangers' accounts. In any event, restric-
tive drawing, while a wide departure from existing practice, is not revolution-
ary in negotiable instruments law. Similar checks are negotiable instruments
in England today.292 And analogies to restrictive drawings are found in the
currently acceptable restrictive endorsement.
Restrictive drawing of course thwarts transferability of the check. Payees
would be unable to use restrictively drawn checks as transfer devices to obtain
money at places other than the specified bank. However. a large number of
checks do circulate simply as payment devices between businesses, and for
these checks, restrictive drawing would provide increased protection without
impairing the check's function. At the same time, the transferability of the
check in other situations can be readily preserved by leaving to the payee the
option of whether or not he desires checks to be restrictively drawn. From a
practical standpoint, the entire scheme can be facilitated if on invoices or re-
quests for government checks, for example, the payee desiring restrictive
drawings would indicate the name of the bank in which he holds a checking
or savings account. However, granting the payee the option to refuse the
292. CHAimas, BrLs OF EXCHANGE § 82 (9th ed. 1927) ; see, e.g., Underwood Ltd.
v. Bank of Liverpool, [1924] 1 K.B. 775; National Bank v. Silke, [1891] 1 Q.B. 435 (C.A).
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restrictive drawing does not imply that he should sustain all losses subse-
quently occurring from forgery of ordinary checks; this would be penalizing
parties who wish to take advantage of the highly useful characteristic of checks
making them transfer devices for payment. Rather, the payee's liability should
be determined by considering all the objectives governing allocation of forgery
losses.
Although restrictive drawing can operate to eliminate some possible for-
geries, it nevertheless leaves many possibilities for forgery untouched. Restric-
tive drawings cannot prevent forged drawer's signatures, for example, nor
alterations on checks made by the payee himself. And of courbe, retaining
the check as a useful transfer device by preserving the payee's option to elect
payment by ordinary check, continues the existing hazards of forgery. Thub,
even with restrictive drawings, forgeries will undoubtedly occur. To allocate
losses from these forgeries, additional proposals for reform are offered.
Proposals for reform of existing law of forgery are offered not with an eye
to doctrinal nicety, but rather with a view of obtaining sensible and equitable
objectives in allocating loss. Early decisions establishing the forged check
and forged endorsement rules compartmentalized subsequent allocation into
doctrines based on type of forgery. But the assumptions underlying the di-
chotomy have seldom been questioned. Clearly, allocating according to type of
forgery and the peculiar availability of defenses developed within theie rules
should be cast aside, since they serve only to frustrate intelligent allocation.
At the same time, the continental law, which allows a forger to pass good title,
does not offer an acceptable solution. By placing risk on the drawer and payee,
it has perhaps precluded development of a widely used check system and the ap-
plication of negligence doctrines. Nor would exclusive adherence to the forged
check or forged endorsement rule be satisfactory. The forged endorsement
rule, by placing loss on takers, defeats transferability and efficient risk dis-
tribution and may also frustrate allocation according to negligence. The forged
check rule does promote transferability and better risk distribution, but it
is probably most removed from gearing loss to negligence.
Initially, since objectives may conflict in particular cases, a priority of ob-
jectives must be established. The following proposals embody a preference for
placing the loss on a negligent party over the goals of most efficient risk dis-
tribution and promotion of transferability where a conflict exists. This pre-
ference is based on a belief that potential liability for breach of commercial
standards will help encourage better business practices, and that fairness dic-
tates that a person whose conduct contributed to a loss should sustain that
loss.29 3
The goal of placing loss on negligent parties can be secured by establishing
a warranty, given by all parties who deal with a check, that they have exercised
reasonable care according to the standards of the business or activity in which
they are engaged in their dealings with the check. This warranty would run
293. See notes 92, 93 supra.
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to all other parties who come in contact with the check. Breach of the war-
ranty would subject a party to liability for any loss arising from a forgery;
and no party who has breached the warranty would be able successfully to sue
another.294 As a result of this suggestion, whenever negligence contributes
to loss, that loss will ultimately fall on the negligent party.
In the event that no party has been negligent in dealing With the check or
that the drawee and another party have both been negligent, loss allocation
should be geared to the promotion of transferability and most efficient risk
distribution. Since transferability can be equally served by holding either
drawer or drawee liable, and since the most desirable risk distribution is
accomplished by placing loss on the drawee, loss which occurs in the absence
of any negligence or in the combined negligence of drawee and others should
be allocated to the drawee. As a result, in these situations, loss becomes one
of the costs of utilizing checks and is paid for ratably by those who draw
checks.
20 5
Uniform treatment of parties is also secured by these suggested changes.
Abolition of the rules -elating to the type of forgery insures that parties who
act with similar regard to business standards will be subject to the same
potentiality of loss. And parenthetically, this provides a boost for transfer-
ability, since parties who take checks will know that they are able to free
themselves from loss by following standard rules. Uniform results in different
jurisdictions rest on universal adoption of the proposals and the subsequent
consistency of courts in construing reasonable standards of care.
The proposed reforms are an attempt to achieve a balance between the
desire to simplify litigation through the use of automatic doctrines and the
desire to maintain a certain degree of flexibility. In the absence of negligence,
certainty as to liability prevails, and thus enables predictability and out of
court settlements. Additionally, certainty may be promoted by a short statute
of limitations placing an end to potential liability on a check and all trans-
actions underlying it. However, in contrast to current law and the U.C.C.,
the statute should end liability for all parties, for the certainty is equally desir-
able for all who deal with checks. The use of negligence doctrines does pre-
clude complete predictability and complicates litigation until limitations have
run. But at the same time, it permits flexibility of standards concomitant with
changing business practices. Moreover, while trials would of course require
a showing of lack of due care, standards providing some degree of certainty
may shortly crystallize either through judicial interpretation or statutory
enactment. In the event that the latter option is preferred, suggestions for
standards geared to existing business practices are set forth in the appendix.
294. Others have suggested that a comparative negligence approach including loss
splitting provisions be studied as a solution. See Notes, 27 IND. L.J. 561 (1952), 14 U. or
CH. L -Rv. 705, 709 (1947); cf. GREmoRY, Lc.isLATivF Loss DxsT Bvirno ix N=u-
GExcE ActioNs 154 (1936).




STATUTE FOR CHECKS WITH UNAUTHORIZED SIGNATURES
AND MATERIAL ALTERATIONS
Section 1. NVARPANTIES ON DEALING WITH CHECKS
(1) Any owner of a checking account, drawer, payee, collecting bank-, and
any other party who transfers a check warrants to all prudent parties who
have been injured by his conduct that he has been prudent in dealing with
the check.
(2) The drawee of the check warrants to all other parties that he has been
prudent in dealing with the check.
Section 2. LIMITATION ON ACTIONS
An unauthorized signature or material alteration cannot be asserted in any
action on a check or an underlying obligation for which a check has been
issued against any party who has not been notified of the unauthorized signa-




(1) "prudent" conduct includes good faith and either the exercise of reason-
able commercial standards of the business in which the party may be engaged,
or if the party is not in any business, freedom from negligence;
(2) "have been injured" refers to an injury which was partially or com-
pletely caused in fact by conduct;
(3) "unauthorized signature" means a signature made without actual, im-
plied, or apparent authority and includes a forgery;
(4) "material alteration" is an alteration of the instrument which changes
the contract of any party to the check in any respect;
(5) "dealings with the check" include all actions which have to do with
the issuance, delivery, receipt, transfer, and payment of checks including the
hiring and supervision of any employees engaged in these transactions.
APPENDIX B
STANDARMS OF CONDUCT*
The drawer of a check must:
(1) Draw the checks in ink or with a check writing machine.
(2) Correctly execute future instruments after notification by the bank
*The standards are in accord with many of those suggested by banks. See A,mccA -
BANKERS AssocIATIoN, BANK TELLuas Do's AND DoN'T's (1952); InvWtM TnusT Con-
P.xY, SArsUADs AGAiNST FORGEmES (1944). The standards are also derived from
case law, although some case law criticized in the text has been disregarded.
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that instruments which he has drawn might be easily altered because too much
space is left on the line on which the amount is written.
(3) Mail checks to the correct address of the payee or his authorized agent.
(4) Ascertain the correct identity of the payee to whom the check is drawn
and delivered.
(5) After having twice been instructed by the bank: (a) balance his account
on the receipt of his statement; and (b) exercise reasonable care to discover
and report to the bank any forged instrument or instrument whose sum has
been altered.
(6) The drawer may delegate any of these duties to his employees and is
not to be considered negligent or barred from recovery if he: (a) establishes
regular procedures which meet the approval of his bank for the drawing, dis-
tribution, and accounting of returned checks, and (b) discovers the existence
of the dishonest employee after unexplainable increases of cost have come to
his attention.
The drawee of a check must:
(1) Examine the authenticity of the signature of the drawer of the check,
with a second examination required for all checks of $1,000 and over.
(2) Examine the check for any irregularities in the chain of endorsement,
or for any alterations.
(3) Notify the drawer of any checks which have been drawn in a careless
manner which would facilitate fraudulent alterations.
(4) Explain to the drawer his obligation to balance his account and examine
returned checks. This explanation should be given at the time the account is
opened and repeated when the first statement is given to the drawer.
(5) Identify a party who presents a check for collection at least by examin-
ing documents which contain the name, description, and signature of the
presenter and by comparing the signature of an endorsement made in the pres-
ence of the drawee with that on the documents.
The recipient of the funds from the drawee or taker from a prior holder must:
(1) Identify the party from whom he receives the check, at least by examin-
ing documents which contain his name, description, and signature, and by com-
paring the signature with an endorsement made in the recipient's presence.
The recipient must indicate on the check a reference to documents examined.
(2) Be free from knowledge of the invalid character of the check at the time
the instrument is further negotiated or is presented for payment.
The payee or true owner must:
(1) Not place a blank endorsement on the check until he is ready to trans-
fer it.
(2) If checks are received or deposited by employees, establish regular
practices which meet the approval of his bank for handling the checks.
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APPENDIX C
CROSS REFERENCE TABLE TO CODE SECTIONS
Code Section Discussed in Text at Notes
1-102. Purposes: Rules of Construction 185*, 186-, 203, 231
3-201. Transfer: Right to Endorsement 189*, 230, 252. 253
3-302. Holder in Due Course 188*, 211, 232, 252,
254, 271, 275
3-405. Impostors: Signature in Name 246*, 247. 248, 249,
of Payee 250, 261, 262, 263, 270
3406. Negligence Contributing to Altera- 224-, 229, 231, 254,
tion or Unauthorized Signature 255, 264, 269, 270,
271, 272, 273, 288
3-407. Alteration 211*, 215, 265, 271, 277
3-417. Warranties on Presentment or 187, 190, 192, 195,
Transfer 201, 207, 208*, 269,
210. 212, 213. 218,
220, 222, 241, 243, 259
3-418. Finality of Payment or Accept- 187*, 190, 198, 201,
ance 217, 242, 260
3-419. Conversion of Instrument 281, 282, 289, 290
4-103. Variation by Agreement 200*, 203, 204*, 205,
206, 221, 234, 235, 278
4-207. Warranties of Customer and Col- 192, 195, 208, 210,
lecting Bank on Transfer or Presen- 212, 220, 223, 239,
tation of Items 254, 259, 291
4-208. When Bank Extending Credit for 260
Item has Security Interest
4-209. When Bank Gives Value for Pur-
poses of Holder in Due Course
*'Marks notes with substantial quotations from the U.C.C
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Code Section
4-401. When Bank May Charge Cus-
tomer's Account





4-406. Customer's Duty to Discover and 233*, 254, 255, 256,
Report Unauthorized Signature or 257, 258, 266, 268,
Alteration 270, 274, 276, 279,
280, 285, 286
4-407. Payor Bank's Right to Subroga- 196*, 220,
tion on Improper Payment
*Marks notes with substantial quotations from the U.CC.
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